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The policies of population relocation put in train following the severe nuclear reactor
accidents at Chernobyl in 1986 and Fukushima Daiichi in 2011 are examined using the
Judgement- or J-value. Here relocation is taken to mean a movement of people that is
long-term or permanent. A review is made of a 1992 IAEA/CEC study of the Chernobyl coun-
termeasures, which includes data from which the effectiveness of the 1986 and post-1990
relocations may be judged using the J-value. The present analysis provides endorsement of
that  study’s conclusion that the post-1990 relocation of 220,000 members of the public could
not  be justiﬁed on the grounds of radiological health beneﬁt. Moreover, application of the
J-value suggests that the ﬁrst Chernobyl relocation is economically defensible for between
26%  and 62% of the roughly 115,000 people actually moved in 1986. Thus only between 9%
and 22% of the 335,000 people ﬁnally relocated after Chernobyl were justiﬁable, based on the
J-value and the data available. Nor does the J-value support the relocation of the 160,000 peo-
ple  moved out on a long-term basis after the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident. The J-value
results for these very severe nuclear accidents should inform the decisions of those deciding
how  best to respond to a big nuclear accident in the future. The overall conclusion is that relo-
cation should be used sparingly if at all after any major nuclear accident. It is recognised that
medical professionals are seeking a good way to communicate radiation risks in response
to  frequent requests from the general public for information and explanation in a post-
accident situation. Radiation-induced loss of life expectancy, which lies at the heart of the
application of the J-value to nuclear accidents, is proposed as an information-rich yet easy to
understand statistic that the medical profession and others may ﬁnd helpful in this regard.©  2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Institution of Chemical
Engineers. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.
org/licenses/by/4.0/).
were justiﬁed and considers the import of the results for future decision1.  Introduction
In the event of an industrial accident with off-site consequences,
decision-makers must decide who, if anyone, ought to be evacuated
from the surrounding area. If the accident results in prolonged restric-
tions on the normal use of the land, then decisions must be made aboutwho can return to their homes and who should be temporarily or per-
∗ Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: philip.thomas@bristol.ac.uk, pjt3.michaelmas@gm
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2017.03.012
0957-5820/© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).manently relocated. In the civil nuclear industry, the only two events
that have caused the authorities to recommend relocation are the acci-
dent at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant in Ukraine in 1986 and that
at the Fukushima Daiichi power station in Japan in 2011. This paper
assesses how far the relocation programmes following these eventsail.com (P.J. Thomas).
making.
 Institution of Chemical Engineers. This is an open access article
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hIt is important to distinguish between “evacuation”, taken for the
urposes of this paper and the NREFS study more generally (NREFS,
016), to be short-term, and “relocation”, taken to be long-term or even
ermanent. Evacuation may be in force for only days or a week or so,
llowing for time to establish the extent of the accident, after which a
ecision may be taken on whether or not to allow return. Temporary
elocation is deﬁned in Ashley et al. (2017) as implying an enforced
eriod of absence of up to 3 months, with relocation regarded as per-
anent if a recommendation to return cannot be made 3 months after
he accident. It would certainly seem that resistance to going back and
roblems with a large-scale return are likely to be encountered once
eople have stayed away for a year or more, as in the cases of the
ccidents at both Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi.
On 26 April 1986, an accident at the nuclear power plant at
hernobyl, Ukraine resulted in a catastrophic failure of the reactor con-
ainment. A ﬁre in the exposed, graphite-moderated core burned for ten
ays before being brought under control. The accident released into the
tmosphere large quantities of isotopes of relatively short half-life such
s iodine (131I has a half-life of 8 days), together with much lower quan-
ities, in terms of total activity, of long-lived isotopes such as caesium
137Cs, 30 years), strontium (90Sr, 28 years) and plutonium (239Pu, 24,000
ears), although their effective half-lives in man’s environment can be
horter. The pattern of radionuclide deposition reﬂected changes of
ind direction and rainfall over the duration of the main release, with
50,000 km2 of land in Ukraine, Belarus and Russia eventually being
lassiﬁed as ‘contaminated’ (UNSCEAR, 2008, p. 50).
The population of the town of Pripyat, 3 km from the power plant,
as relocated one day after the accident. The following week (2–6 May
986) the entire population within 30 km of the stricken reactor was
elocated. Subsequent radiation monitoring led to further relocations
ncluding areas of the Gomel region of Belarus and the Bryansk region of
ussia, some 150 km to the northeast of Chernobyl. A total of 116,000
eople had been relocated by September 1986 (Smith and Beresford,
005, p. 6). Mapping of the contaminated regions in the following years
ed to the establishment of the State All-Union and Republican Pro-
ramme in 1990, under which another 220,000 people were relocated
rom areas with elevated readings for caesium-137 ground contami-
ation (Lochard and Schneider, 1992). By 2000, some eight years after
he break-up of the Soviet Union and fourteen years after the accident,
early 4600 people were still waiting for new homes in Ukraine, as were
000 in Belarus (UNDP, 2002, p. 34).
On 11 March 2011, the Great East Japan Earthquake led to the loss
f offsite power at several nuclear power stations. This led to the auto-
atic shutdown of the plants, with the cooling pumps being powered
ost-shutdown by on-site, back-up generators. However, the earth-
uake also triggered a series of tsunamis that hit the east coast of Japan,
ausing the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant to be overwhelmed.
he failure of the back-up power supplies led to pumped cooling being
ost for three reactors, and this resulted in damage ﬁrst to the cores
nd subsequently to the reactor pressure vessels. Operations to reduce
ressure in the reactor vessels – or possibly, leaks from the vessels –
esulted in the release of radionuclides into the reactor buildings. The
ver-heated fuel assemblies led to a chemical reaction that produced
ydrogen gas in the reactor buildings. This subsequently exploded,
eleasing radionuclides into the environment (UNSCEAR, 2013, p. 34).
In the hours and days following the accident, the Japanese authori-
ies ordered the progressive evacuation of those living near to the plant.
 20-km ‘Restricted Zone’ was established around the plant from which
8,000 people had been evacuated by the following day. Further com-
ulsory and voluntary evacuation zones were established, extending as
ar as 40 km to the northwest (Iitate Village), based on monitoring of the
eposition pattern. Between 118,000 and 150,000 people had been relo-
ated from the vicinity of the power plant by the end of 2011 (UNSCEAR,
013, p. 50; Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, M., 2014, p. 105).
Following both the Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents,
ore than one hundred thousand people were removed from their
omes within a few months. Nearly thirty years after the Chernobyl
ccident, over one-third of a million people have been relocated and fewave returned. Four years after the Fukushima Daiichi accident, morethan 85,000 people remain in temporary or permanent accommodation
away from their former homes (City Population, 2016).
Whilst leaving one’s home may provide initial reassurance, an
enforced long period away brings disruption and dislocation, with the
attendant social and psychological penalties. Moreover, staying away
for a substantial time will reduce both social and occupational ties to
the original location and engender a general reluctance to return. The
evidence from Fukushima Daiichi is that young people, who tend to be
more mobile, are even less likely than their elders to wish to return to
their original dwelling place (Tsubokura and Morita, 2015). Inevitably
this will have an adverse effect on the viability of the towns and vil-
lages from which the people were removed even after the authorities
have declared them safe for return.
A similar effect has been observed in a non-nuclear context follow-
ing the evacuation of New Orleans in response to Hurricane Katrina
in August 2005. The population of New Orleans 11 months after the
hurricane was down 25% on what it had been a year earlier, and had
risen to only 90% of the pre-hurricane level by July 2014 (US Census
Bureau, 2015). (Some have suggested, however, that part of the even-
tual shortfall might have been caused by a pre-excising decline in the
New Orleans economy).
This paper assesses the extent to which the mass relocations at
Chernobyl and Fukushima were justiﬁed and what, if any, long-term
health beneﬁts resulted from relocation. In particular, the analysis con-
siders whether the very high costs involved could have been better
spent elsewhere, including on other, more effective, interventions.
2.  The  Judgement-  or  J-value
The J-value framework provides an objective tool that assesses
the cost-effectiveness of safety schemes that reduce the risk
to human life (Thomas et al., 2006a). It balances the costs of
a safety scheme against the improvement in quality of life of
those affected as a result of implementing that scheme. The
Judgement- or J-value is the ratio of the actual (or contem-
plated) sum to be spent on protection to the maximum that it
is reasonable to spend if the quality of life of those affected is
not to be compromised. Ensuring that the safety expenditure
is economically and scientiﬁcally reasonable implies that this
ratio should be less than or equal to unity, J ≤ 1.
The J-value builds on the ground rule established in welfare
economics (see, for example, Boadway and Bruce, 1984) that
the sum of money to be spent on mitigating an adverse effect
or compensating for it should be the amount that the people
affected would themselves be prepared to pay for such mit-
igation or to receive in compensation. In practice, of course,
payment for such a safety measure is often made by another
person or body such as a company or Government. The J-value
then postulates that the average person affected will be pre-
pared, in principle if not in actuality, to pay for his or her share
in a safety measure as long as his/her quality of life is not com-
promised as a result. Here the quality of life of those affected
is measured by the Life Quality Index (Nathwani and Lind,
1997; Thomas et al., 2006a, 2010; Nathwani et al., 2009), which
takes account of how much the average individual affected has
available to spend and how long he/she can expect to live from
now on, with the balance between the two mediated by the
appropriate value of risk-aversion (Thomas and Waddington,
2017; Thomas, 2016).
Payment by the organisation owning the plant or by the
Government corresponds to a strengthened version of the
Kaldor–Hicks compensation principle (Kaldor, 1939; Hicks,
1939), whereby society is judged to be better off if the gainer
from some economic activity is able to pay the loser the appro-
priate compensation and still be better off at the end of the
day. Under Kaldor–Hicks the payment is hypothetical, and
18  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49while it could be made from the extra income that the activ-
ity generates for the gainer, he has no obligation to make any
such transfer (see, for example, Johansson, 1991). It is possible,
especially after a very large industrial accident has occurred
that, in the event, there will be no gainer. In such a case we
may replace the term “gainer” with “expected gainer”, since
we can be sure that the ﬁrm will only build and run a plant
when it expects to proﬁt from it, and would not do so if it
expected to make a loss as a result of a severe accident.
Often the state will step in if the owner of the plant is
unable to foot all the losses, a position that is given legal sta-
tus in the case of nuclear plant, where Governments socialise
the risk beyond a certain level (Kidd, 2011; World Nuclear
Association, 2015). The Kaldor–Hicks criterion, written in
terms of “expected gainer”, will once again be satisﬁed since
the Government may be assumed to have allowed a regulated
plant to operate on the basis that society could be expected to
gain from its operation.
The J-value provides an objective criterion against which
the reasonable extent of health and safety expenditure can
be judged, something that is especially valuable when pay-
ment is to be made by a third party, such as an industrial
company or Government. It could also be used as a guide by
an affected individual wishing to invest in additional protec-
tion, for example voluntary relocation even when this course
of action is not recommended nor sponsored by Government.
Clearly such a person is in sole charge of his/her own resources
and there is no onus on him or her to make use of any J-
value information. (Interestingly, however, there is evidence
that individuals, communities and nations tend, on average,
to act as if their decisions on life extending actions were being
guided by the J-value (Thomas and Waddington, 2017)).
In Section 3 of the paper it will be shown how the J-
value can be applied to assess relocation strategies following
a nuclear accident. The second programme of mass reloca-
tions from the Chernobyl area (in 1990) coincided with the
increasing openness of the Soviet state and consequently the
literature contains sufﬁcient technical and economic data to
enable a detailed J-value assessment of that relocation pro-
gramme.  Estimates of the economic costs and health beneﬁts
are used in Section 4 to provide an assessment of the cost-
effectiveness of the relocation strategy after 1990. An attempt
has been made in Section 5 to extrapolate the 1990 data back
to 1986 in order to estimate the J-value of the ﬁrst relocation
scheme. Section 6 begins with a J-value analysis of the pro-
vision of temporary housing following the Fukushima Daiichi
accident and goes on to analyse how the radiation risk averted
by relocation may be compared with the increased risk to life
arising from the relocation process itself. Section 7 discusses
the lessons learnt from the relocation strategies at Chernobyl
and Fukushima Daiichi. The same Section also discusses how
socio-political aspects may be factored into decisions on pub-
lic safety, and considers, further, how residual radiation risks
can be communicated most accurately to members of the gen-
eral public. Conclusions are given in Section 8.
3.  Applying  the  J-value  to  assess  relocation
strategies
The J-value approach balances safety expenditure against the
extension of life-expectancy brought about by the introduc-
tion of measures to improve safety. In the present context the
proposed safety scheme is the relocation of people from their
homes near the site of a nuclear accident to somewhere wherethe risk of harm from radiation exposure is lower. The safety
expenditure is likely to be dominated by the construction costs
of new housing and infrastructure.
The J-value framework postulates that the fundamental
factors inﬂuencing the quality of life for an individual are
how long he or she can expect to live from now on (his/her
life expectancy, Xd) and how much he/she will have available
to spend (income, G). The life quality index, Q, can then be
deﬁned by (see Nathwani and Lind, 1997; Nathwani et al., 2009;
Thomas et al., 2006a, 2010)
Q = GqXd (1)
Here G is normally chosen to be the GDP per head of the nation
concerned, which has the effect of valuing the next day of life
the same for each person in the nation, rich or poor, male
or female, old or young. This ethical decision is regarded as
appropriate when safety decisions are being considered that
would affect a representative subset of the nation’s citizens.
The subscript ‘d’ on life expectancy, X, allows for the
generality of discounting of future utility of income, where
the discount factor can be incorporated equivalently into
the ‘discounted’ life expectancy (Thomas et al., 2006a, 2010).
Meanwhile the fact that q is a constant means that Gq is a
Power utility function of income, u (G).  q is the complement
of risk-aversion, ε = 1 − q, where the hyphenated noun, risk-
aversion, is used to signify the negative of the normalised
derivative of marginal utility, m,  with respect to income: ε =
− (G/m)dm/dG = −Gu′′/u′. Here u = Gq is the utility of income,
while m = du/dG = u′. The reader may conﬁrm easily the con-
sistency of these equations that deﬁne the dimensionless
variable, ε. Pratt (1964), who introduced the concept, called
ε the “local proportional risk aversion”. Economists use the
word, “elasticity”, to denote a normalised derivative, so that
the same quantity can also be described as the ‘negative of the
elasticity of marginal utility of wealth’. The ‘coefﬁcient of rel-
ative risk aversion’ is another name used. But the desirability
of a shorter title has led the author into using the hyphen-
ated term, ‘risk-aversion’, ε, here and elsewhere. See Thomas
(2016) for a fuller discussion of the history of utility functions
and risk-aversion. The same article also explains how ε is well
correlated with what we  might in normal speech call aversion
to risk, thus providing a further justiﬁcation for the simple
term, ‘risk-aversion’.
Thomas and Waddington (2017) used pan-national data to
derive a common value of risk-aversion, ε = 0.95, ﬁnding that
the ﬁgure reduces to 0.91 in the case of developed countries
such as the USA and the UK. Hence ε = 0.95 was used in the
characterisation of the USSR and the Former Soviet Union,
while ε = 0.91 was adopted for Japan.
The discussion in Thomas and Waddington (2017) of the
value of ε = 0.91 used for developed nations includes a compar-
ison with the value, ε = 0.82, derived for the UK  from working
time data (Thomas et al., 2010). The higher value is shown
in Thomas and Waddington (2017) to correspond to an equal,
50:50 deal between the employer and the employee on how
much satisfaction the average employee will gain from his
work. The ﬁgure of 0.91 receives further corroboration in a
recent paper (Thomas, 2017a) that uses this value in a suc-
cessful test of the J-value model against the observed increase
in life expectancy at birth in the UK over a 20-year period. The
larger ﬁgure resolves a potential weakness associated with the
earlier, lower ﬁgure for risk-aversion which assumed the aver-
age employee took no beneﬁt other than economic from his
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Jime working. The increase in risk-aversion will lead to higher
mounts being sanctioned for safety spending.
An average individual may maintain or improve his or
er life quality by giving up part of his/her annual income,
G, to pay for a protection system that restores his/her life
xpectancy to what it would be in the absence of the risk (e.g.
homas et al., 2006a, Eq. (14)):
G ≤ G
q
ıXd
Xd
(2)
here ıXd is the loss of discounted life expectancy from expo-
ure to the risk.
A cohort, i, of Ni similarly affected individuals should be
illing to spend, per year, up to
GNi = Ni ıG =
GNi
q
ıXd,i
Xd,i
(3)
If an annual amount ıGˆNi is actually spent then the J-value
or cohort i will be ratio of the amount spent to the maximum
hat it is reasonable to spend,
i =
ıGˆNi
ıGNi
= q
Ni
ıGˆNi
G
(
ıXd,i
Xd,i
)−1
(4)
.1.  Combining  the  J-value  for  multiple  cohorts
n extensive relocation strategy such as that implemented at
hernobyl or Fukushima Daiichi will, in practice, apply to mul-
iple locations each of which may have a different degree of
and contamination. The beneﬁts of relocation will therefore
ary by initial locality, as will the amount that it is reasonable
o spend on the strategy. To calculate the J-value, the maxi-
um reasonable expenditure must be summed over all the
ocations.
Consider a strategy that relocates some people from an
rea of relatively high potential dose, others from an area of
edium dose, another involving a lower starting exposure,
nd so on. The population may be divided into m cohorts,
here all the individuals within the same cohort face the same
otential dose. For example, following both the Chernobyl
nd Fukushima Daiichi accidents, areas were categorized
ccording to surface contamination, allowing a corresponding
adiation dose to be deduced.
On average each person in a given area will receive the
ame effective dose and thus lose the same amount of life
xpectancy. The maximum that a given cohort should be pre-
ared to spend to avert the risk is given by Eq. (3). The total
nnual amount, ıGN, that should be spent on the relocation
cheme is the sum over all the individual cohorts:
GN =
m∑
i=1
ıGNi =
G
q
m∑
i=1
Ni
ıXd,i
Xd,i
(5)
here the subscript, N, refers to the total number of people,
 =
∑m
i=1Ni. If an annual amount ıGˆN is actually spent, then
y deﬁnition the J-value will be
ˆ ˆ
(
m∑ ıX )−1
 = ıGN
ıGN
= q ıGN
G
i=1
Ni
d,i
Xd,i
(6)In practice, it is convenient to evaluate a potential Ji-value
for each cohort separately from Eq. (4) and then to combine the
results to give the actual J-value. From Eq. (4), the fractional
change in discounted life expectancy for a particular cohort
can be expressed as
ıXd,i
Xd,i
= q
JiNi
ıGˆNi
G
(7)
Substituting this into Eq. (6) gives
J = q ıGˆN
G
(
m∑
i=1
Ni
q
JiNi
ıGˆNi
G
)−1
=
(
m∑
i=1
ıGˆNi
ıGˆN
1
Ji
)−1
(8)
The relocation costs will be dominated by the capital
expenditure of building new housing and infrastructure, so
that, neglecting economies of scale likely to have some inﬂu-
ence on the overall cost, the amount spent per head may be
regarded as constant:
ıGˆN
N
= ıGˆNi
Ni
(9)
for all cohorts, i = 1, 2,. . .,m.  Re-arranging this and substituting
into Eq. (8) gives
J =
(
m∑
i=1
Ni
N
1
Ji
)−1
= N
m∑
i=1
Ni
Ji
(10)
Taking the deﬁnition of N from above gives a relation
between the Ji-values for each of the cohorts separately and
the J-value for the combined population:
J =
m∑
i=1
Ni
m∑
i=1
Ni
Ji
(11)
This result shows that it is possible to consider each cohort
separately and then combine the individual J-value results in
a ﬁnal step.
3.2.  Amortizing  the  up-front  capital  costs
For the common case where the costs of a safety scheme are
dominated by an up-front capital spend, as exempliﬁed by the
need to provide infrastructure to facilitate relocation, Thomas
et al. (2010) have shown how the expenditure can be amor-
tized. The J-value for an intervention with an up-front cost of
ıVN that beneﬁts N people is given by
J =
⎧⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
qıVˆN
NG
Xd
ıXd
(
r∗
1 − e−r∗Xd
)
r∗ > 0
qıVˆN
NGıXd
r∗ = 0
(12)
where the “social discount rate”, r*, is that appropriate for
comparing the costs and beneﬁts of schemes that have
future societal beneﬁt (corresponding to the “discount rate”
of Thomas et al. (2010)).
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Table 1 – Economic parameters adopted for the USSR in
1986 and 1990 and for Japan in 2011.
Country USSR USSR Japan
Year 1986 1990 2011
GDP per head 2851a 3532a 34,294b
Currency Rouble Rouble International
dollar
GDP growth rate (%) 0.9c 0.9c 0.6d
Social discount ratee (%) 0.9 0.9 0.6
a United Nations Statistics Division (2013).
b World Bank (2012).
c Averaged over 1975–1989 (Bolt and van Zanden, 2013).
d Averaged over 1997–2011 (World Bank, 2012).
e Assuming a net discount rate of 0%.This formulation conforms to a strong version of intergen-
erational equity, which requires that those N people alive at
the time of the implementation of the safety measure and
protected by it should notionally be prepared to pay for it
(even when another body will actually foot the bill in prac-
tice), spreading their payments over their average discounted
life expectancy, Xd, which is about 35 years for the former
USSR and 43 years for Japan when a “net discount rate” of
zero is applied. The change in discounted life expectancy is
found not only for those living at the start of the relocation
but also for those born within the relocated community during
the period when dose is being averted. (This period ends either
when the community returns home or when the dose being
averted has fallen to a low level). The N people alive when
relocation begins are then assumed, notionally, to regard a
weighted average change in discounted life expectancy, ıXd,
covering both those already living and those yet to be born, as
their own when estimating what they would be prepared to
pay for relocation.
3.3.  Economic  parameters
The J-value depends on established actuarial and economic
parameters such as the life tables, gross domestic product
(GDP) per head, GDP growth rates and discount rates. These
parameters vary over time and from country to country, and
several sources of data were used to ﬁnd the appropriate val-
ues for each calculation.
The World Health Organisation (WHO) publishes life tables
for its member states based on a review of national censuses,
surveys, registration records and similar data (World Health
Organization, 2012). The abridged life tables provide statis-
tics on the number of deaths per year at age intervals of ﬁve
years, plus infant mortalities at 0 and 1 year. The life tables
for Ukraine, Belarus and Russia from 1990 were used for the
J-value life expectancy calculations in both 1986 and 1990. The
2011 life tables for Japan were used for the Fukushima Daiichi
analysis (World Health Organization, 2013).
The World Bank publishes GDP per head data for the UN
member states. The data are updated annually and at the
time of the analysis covered the years 1980–2011 (World Bank,
2012). The data are available both in current US dollars based
on market exchange rates and in current international dollars
based on purchasing power parity (PPP) calculations (OECD,
2011). The PPP exchange rate can differ from the market
exchange rate, which measures the relative value of goods
traded between countries and is driven, in practice, by pro-
cessed and high-value goods. In contrast, the PPP exchange
rate also takes into account non-traded goods and services
that are produced and consumed within a country. The aver-
age person’s quality of life in countries with little dependence
on international trade is dominated by these, in-country
essentials of life (housing, fuel and food). The PPP exchange
rate is determined by the cost of purchasing goods and ser-
vices in the local currency in such a case. On the other hand,
in a country that depends on international trade for its essen-
tials (typically high-income countries), the PPP exchange rate
is dominated by the cost of obtaining these foreign goods and
services and so tends towards the market exchange rate. Thus
in both low-income and high-income countries, the PPP data
give the best measure of what the average person can afford
to buy, and are the data generally used in J-value analyses.However, the World Bank dataset does not include GDP val-
ues from the USSR prior to 1990. Therefore, in order to applythe J-value to the USSR at the time of the Chernobyl acci-
dent in 1986, GDP and population values were obtained from
the National Accounts Main Aggregates Database of the UN
Statistics Division (2013; hereafter “UNSTATS”). Lochard and
Schneider (1992, p. 26) used similar ﬁgures. An estimate of the
GDP growth rates for the USSR in 1986 and 1990 was calcu-
lated from the Maddison Project of the University of Groningen
(Bolt and van Zanden, 2013). That project provides historical
data on GDP and population growth, from an amalgamation
of national accounts and estimates. Their data are presented
in international dollars at a ﬁxed epoch of 1990, giving what
appear to be the most realistic estimate of the USSR growth
rate that could be found (the raw values in the UNSTATS data
were uncorrected for inﬂation and exchange rates). However,
it should be noted that there is likely to be signiﬁcant uncer-
tainty in all the USSR economic statistics, given the political
structure of the country at that time.
It is common economic practice to discount future costs
and beneﬁts, on the basis that people prefer to receive goods
and services now rather than later. Discounting enters the
J-value framework in two contexts: to discount the utility
of an individual’s future income, or, equivalently his/her life
expectancy (the “net discount rate”, r) and to discount the
costs and beneﬁts of schemes that have societal beneﬁt (the
“social discount rate”, r*). Thomas and Waddington (2017) have
argued that the clear correlation of increasing life expectancy
with increasing GDP across some 180 countries, can be best
explained if the net discount rate is zero for all countries.
The social discount rate then becomes equal to the growth
rate of the average individual’s income, g, equal to the GDP
growth rate for a steady-state population. The following dis-
count rates then hold for the J-value calculations:
r = 0
r∗ = g
(13)
(Thomas and Waddington, 2017, Eq. (66)).
The economic parameters used in the analysis for Cher-
nobyl and Fukushima Daiichi are given in Table 1.
3.4.  Physical  data
The data we have used for the paper are the best we could
gather from publicly available reports on the two accidents at
Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi. There are obviously uncer-
tainties with respect to both the dose received and the harm
that radiation causes, although almost certainly both esti-
mates can be made with a better accuracy than for any other
Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49 21
i
m
i
h
t
f
r
e
l
4
T
w
a
t
t
b
a
d
v
i
p
b
C
y
l
a
d
o
b
i
d
t
t
4
1
T
a
T
t
w
P
t
s
b
t
e
Lndustrial carcinogen. Moreover, rather than give a best esti-
ate of radiation harm subject to a variance, the ICRP chooses
nstead to promulgate a conservative estimate of radiation
arm coefﬁcients. Thus, to a large extent, the uncertainty on
his part of the radiation harm calculation has been accounted
or in a conservative way.
Accordingly the ﬁgures for radiation dose should be
egarded as best-estimate, but the associated loss of life
xpectancy is then somewhat pessimistic in that the loss of
ife expectancy may be overstated.
.  Chernobyl  relocation  after  1990
here were two relocations after the 1986 Chernobyl accident,
ith the ﬁrst, involving 115,000 people, being complete within
 few months. The analysis detailed in this paper is based on
he best data we  could gather after the event and it is clear that
he authorities’ state of knowledge would necessarily have
een much lower in April 1986. It is recognised that they faced
 major nuclear accident of unprecedented scale and the study
oes not seek to judge adversely their action in instituting a
ery large relocation in 1986, even though this will be shown
n Section 5 to be possibly excessive. As a general point, the
urpose of the research is to enable lessons for the future to
e drawn rather than to give verdicts on the past.
The situation is less clear-cut in the case of the second
hernobyl relocation of 220,000 people which took place four
ears later in 1990. By this time the radioactive release had
ong since ceased, and surface radioactivity levels were avail-
ble for all the districts affected by fall out, both close to and
istant from the plant. Moreover, the early results of the work
f Lochard and Schneider (1992), discussed next, were also
ecoming available.
The difference in the information available to the author-
ties in April 1986 and in 1990 is considered further in the
iscussion of Section 7, giving additional pointers to the near-
erm management of any big nuclear accident that occurs in
he future.
.1.  The  IAEA/CEC  study  by  Lochard  and  Schneider,
990–1992
he effectiveness of relocation post 1990 was the subject of
 detailed study carried out by Lochard and Schneider (1992).
he work, which started in 1990, was carried out under con-
ract for the Commission of the European Communities (CEC)
ithin the framework of the IAEA International Chernobyl
roject. The IAEA was itself responding to a request from
he Soviet Government that an international group of experts
hould be organised to review and evaluate the measures
eing taken to assure safe living conditions for the people con-
inuing to live in the affected areas. Lochard and Schneider
xplained that the work was
“an attempt to provide a coherent framework for all the
available data [in 1990] concerning the costs and doses
averted associated [with] various relocation strategies, for
the population living in the contaminated areas affected by
the Chernobyl accident.”
The methodology is summarised in a paper written by
ochard et al. (1992) as a combination of“the use of a baseline monetary value of the man-Sievert
calculated according to the human capital method with arisk aversion factor, increasing with the level of contamina-
tion, to reﬂect the general attitude of the population living
in the contaminated areas”.
Lochard and Schneider used a risk aversion exponent, a,
to characterise the disproportionate aversion to larger doses
of radiation that might characterise people living in the vicin-
ity of Chernobyl. Hence the monetary value, ˛i (Roubles), of
unit collective dose received in individual doses of di (mSv) is
related to the baseline monetary value, ˛0, received in baseline
doses of d0 of 1 mSv  or lower, leading to the equation:
˛i
˛0
=
(
di
d0
)a
(14)
A unity “risk aversion exponent”, a = 1, corresponds to risk-
neutrality, in which case a dose of 20 mSv  would be regarded
as 20 times more  likely to cause harm than a 1mSv dose. This
coincides with the stance prevalent in the scientiﬁc commu-
nity and in general use as the basis for safety regulation in
the nuclear industry (see, for example, ICRP, 2007). But putting
a = 1.5 would mean that a dose of 20 mSv  would be perceived
as about 90 times more  harmful that a dose of 1 mSv.
Lochard and Schneider constructed a paired base-case by
ﬁrst setting a = 1.2 to give what may be denoted “Base Case
LS1”, and then increasing the parameter to a = 1.5 to give
“Base Case LS2”, where the sufﬁx, “LS”, denotes “Lochard and
Schneider”. The range, 1.2 ≤ a ≤ 1.5, was considered by Lochard
and Schneider to “reﬂect the uncertainty attached to this key
parameter”.
It is worth emphasizing at this point that the authors of
the present paper are not endorsing the use of a risk aversion
exponent, a:a > 1, as a substitute for the parameter, risk-
aversion, ε. The latter, which is integral to the J-value method,
is scientiﬁcally grounded and provides a general model for
human beings’ aversion to risk (Thomas, 2013, 2016). Lochard
and Schneider were wanting to ﬁnd some way to compen-
sate for their use of a human capital model in calculating
their baseline, monetary value of the man-Sievert since the
human capital approach is equivalent to the use of a utility
function with a zero risk-aversion (see Thomas and Taylor,
2012). Setting risk-aversion at its risk-neutral value in the util-
ity function, ε = 0, must necessarily entail a low estimate of
how much ought to be spent against any given radiation dose,
meaning that some mechanism elsewhere in the calculation
had to be devised to allow the permissible spend to increase.
Lochard and Schneider’s chosen method to fulﬁl this task, a
strictly positive “risk aversion exponent”, cannot lay claim to
any general justiﬁcation. However, it may be seen as an early
attempt to introduce risk aversion into the process of radiation
protection.
Lochard and Schneider (1992) found that none of the
220,000 people relocated after 1990 should have been moved
under Base Case LS1, when a = 1.2. The argument for reloca-
tion would be even weaker if a were set to the risk-neutral
value of unity:
“Using a baseline value of the man-Sievert, estimated on
the basis of human capital considerations, it is not justiﬁed
to relocate anyone from the controlled zones”. (Section 10,
Conclusion)
Just 14,700 people should have been moved in Base Case
LS2, when a = 1.5, speciﬁcally those living in areas with a con-
tamination level in 1990 that was higher than 1480 kBq m−2.
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Table 2 – Fractional distribution of population living in
each activity band over the Republics of Belarus, Ukraine
and Russia.
kBq m−2 Ci km−2 Belarus Ukraine Russia Total
185–555 5–15 0.5065 0.2789 0.2146 1.0
555–1480 15–40 0.5041 0.1075 0.3884 1.0
>1480 >40 0.5663 0.1566 0.2771 1.0Lochard et al. (1992) make it clear that they regard Base
Case LS2 as highly conservative:
“Based on the most conservative assumptions only popu-
lation above 40 Ci/km2 [=1480 kBq m−2] should have been
relocated.”
But even under Base Case LS2, the great majority (205,000
out of 220,000 people actually relocated post 1990) should have
been left in place.
Apart from the high-end risk aversion parameter, a = 1.5,
another of the factors regarded as conservative is the dosi-
metric model developed at the Moscow Institute of Biophysics
(MIB) and used to convert the measured caesium-137 sur-
face contamination (kBq m−2) into dose equivalents (mSv y−1).
Lochard and Schneider considered that the estimates of the
long-term doses might be as much as 75% too high: the param-
eter, k, in the denominator of the dose Eqs. (15) and (16) below
takes the value, 1.7, for the Base Cases, LS1 and LS2, but
the enhanced decline in Caesium-137 in man’s environment
might make a value of 3.0 more  appropriate (see Section 8.1 of
Lochard and Schneider (1992), Conservatism of the model).
Support for a speedier effective decline comes from later
work by Robison et al. (2003) and Paller et al. (2014), who report
that while the physical half-life of caesium-137 is 30 years (as
reﬂected in Eqs. (15) and (16) below), its half-life in the envi-
ronment may be signiﬁcantly lower. Their studies, based on
measurements in the Marshall Islands in the one case and
on the Savannah River site in the USA in the other, produces
various estimates for the effective half-life depending on the
environmental medium under consideration, from less than
9 years up to a maximum of 17 years. Work on Chernobyl
post-dating Lochard and Schneider (1992) suggests that the
effective half-life of 137Cs for use in calculating external dose
is 18.8 years, while the value to be used in calculations of inter-
nal dose should be 23 years in the case of mushrooms but 15
years for general agricultural products (Jacob et al., 2009).
Although Lochard and Schneider (1992) advocate caution
in their Section 2.1, Background [to Methodology]:
“Because of the many  simpliﬁcations and assumptions
adopted in the model, the results have to be interpreted
carefully and considered only as indicative estimates of the
cost and effectiveness of the protective measures envis-
aged.”
the authors address the simpliﬁcations and assumptions
by conducting the Sensitivity Analysis detailed in Section 8. This
examines the effects of variations in:
• the dosimetric model,
• the economic parameters,
• the duration of the protective measures, and
• the internal dose correction factor.
after which Lochard and Schneider comment that
“The various sensitivity analyses do not signiﬁcantly
change the conclusions of the base case evaluation.”
Moreover the authors state, in their Section 10. Conclusion,
that
“The model developed has been extensively discussed,
and presents what is believed to be the best compromise
achievable, taking into account the various uncertainties.”
and conclude that“With some allowance for risk aversion [1.2 ≤ a < 1.5] the
results suggest that there are no strong arguments for
the implementation of further measures other than those
already envisaged*, unless relocation costs differ largely
from the base case [the paired Base Cases, LS1 and LS2].”
*In their Section 1, Introduction, Lochard and Schneider
(1992) comment that “At the time the present study started
some settlements had already been relocated, but there
was a strong on-going debate on the opportunity of future
relocations below the criteria stated in the Programme.”
They were able to recommend the relocation of only the
14,700 people living with a 1990 level of 1480 kBq m−2 or
higher, and this recommendation was based on the more
conservative Base Case LS2.
We know from Lochard, Schneider and Kelly (1992) that the
calculations recorded in Lochard and Schneider (1992), were
ﬁrst performed in 1990. But despite their implication that a
further mass relocation should not be carried out in 1990 or
later, it is a matter of record that 220,000 people were relo-
cated after that date. Lochard and Schneider (1992) include
comment relevant to this outturn in their Section 1, Introduc-
tion:
“A large fraction of the money already spent (or to be spent
in the next few years) on improving living conditions will
achieve little or no reduction in dose. In fact, most of the
resources already allocated (or to be allocated) need to be
seen as direct or indirect compensation for those who may
have been affected by the accident, mainly from the psy-
chological point of view, in order to improve the public
acceptability of the situation.”
4.2.  Applying  the  J-value
In addition to its recommendation, not acted on, against a sec-
ond mass relocation in 1990, the Lochard and Schneider report
is valuable in providing a detailed breakdown of the popula-
tions, doses and costs, which can be used in J-value analysis.
Their paper provides the distribution of the Soviet population
in terms of the level of 137Cs ground contamination experi-
enced in 1990. The three Republics of the Former Soviet Union
concerned, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia, were not affected uni-
formly by the accident. Table 2 gives the fractional distribution
of population in each of 3 activity bands over the Republics,
based on Table 2 of Lochard and Schneider (1992). Making the
natural assumption that the fractions of Table 2 apply uni-
formly within each of the ﬁner contamination bands given in
Table 1 of Lochard and Schneider allows an estimation to be
made of the number of people within each of the narrower
activity bands within the 3 Republics. See Table 3.
The status of ‘contaminated’ was applied by the Soviet
authorities to areas with surface contamination above
37 kBq m−2 of 137Cs and was said to correspond to an annual
individual effective dose of approximately 1 mSv  (or 70 mSv
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Fig. 1 – The population distribution as a function of 137Cs surface contamination in 1990. Black indicates the ofﬁcial
relocation limit at >1480 kBq m−2 while the effective limit of >555 kBq m−2 is shown in dark grey, corresponding to the strict
control zone. The vertical scale has been truncated in order to em
Table 3 – Soviet population subject to post-Chernobyl
restrictions in 1990, as a function of 137Cs surface
contamination.
137Cs surface
contamination
Number of people
kBq m−2 Ci km−2 Belarus Ukraine Russia Total
185–370 5–10 208,371 114,892 88,537 411,800
370–555 10–15 44,123 24,329 18,748 87,200
555–740 15–20 59,422 12,733 45,745 117,900
740–925 20–25 14,162 3035 10,903 28,100
925–1110 25–30 12,550 2689 9661 24,900
1110–1295 30–35 7913 1696 6092 15,700
1295–1480 35–40 2671 572 2056 5300
1480–2220 40–60 5886 1633 2881 10,400
2220–2960 60–80 1924 534 942 3400
>2960 >80 509 141 249 900
>185 >5 357,531 162,254 185,184 705,600
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loss of life expectancy roughly 10% higher than the estimatever a lifetime). It may be noted 1 mSv  is the current ICRP
ecommended dose limit for ongoing practices, but not
or interventions after an accident, when the post-accident
ose optimization exercise may recommend the toleration of
igher levels of radiation as a result of additional account
eing taken of social and economic factors. Then two partic-
lar zones were designated for possible further precautionary
easures: a ‘control zone’, where the 137Cs concentration was
bove  185 kBq m−2 but below 555 kBq m−2, and a ‘strict control
one’, which covered populations living in areas with a 137Cs
ontamination level over 555 kBq m−2 (Fig. 1).
Lochard and Schneider (1992) presented the MIB dosimetry
odel, which allowed them to estimate average internal and
xternal effective doses for any given year from 1990 to 2060
rom the surface contamination. Starting from t = 0 in 1988,
he external effective dose equivalent in year t was given by
ex(t) = 0.28C
k
(
0.7e−0.3t + 0.3e−0.024t
)
(15)
here H is in mSv  per annum, C is the 137C surface contam-
nation (Ci km−2) in 1990, 4 years after the 1986 deposition,
nd k = 1.7 is a correction factor that “only takes account ofphasize the distribution at high activity levels.
known conservatisms based on measurements up to 1990”.
The internal effective dose equivalent in year t was  given by
Hin(t) =
0.28C + 1.1232
k
(
0.43e−0.35t + e−0.05t
)
(16)
The principal components of this model may be identiﬁed
approximately with the exponential decays of 134Cs (with a
natural decay constant of  = 0.33 y−1 or a half-life of t1/2 = 2.1
years) and 137Cs ( = 0.023 y−1 or t1/2 = 30.1 years), with mod-
iﬁcations due to environmental and biological factors. The
total annual dose per year, Hex + Hin, between 1990 and 2060
is plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of surface contamination in
1990.
The population distributions and effective doses enabled
a calculation of the average loss of life expectancy for people
exposed to these radiation hazards. Life Tables for Belarus,
Russia and Ukraine in 1990 were obtained from the World
Health Organization (2012). For each of the thirty population
groups from Table 2 the life-table hazard rates were perturbed
by the additional radiation hazard for fatal cancers (ICRP, 2007;
Thomas and Jones, 2009) due to the effective doses that would
have been received in the absence of relocation (Eqs. (15)
and (16)). The calculation was carried out for the seventy-one
years from 1990 to 2060, assuming a steady-state population
over this period. Table 4 presents the expected loss of life
expectancy averaged over the three Republics for each of the
dose bands, together with the effective doses received. The
variation (sample standard deviation) in loss of life expectancy
between the Republics was 2% of the mean.
The calculations were carried out using the CLEARE pro-
gram (Change of Life Expectancy due to Atomic Radiation
Exposure) based on the extended Marshall model (Marshall
et al., 1983; Thomas et al., 2006c; Thomas and Jones, 2009).
Results were compared with the loss of life expectancy
reported in Lochard and Schneider’s Table 18 on the basis of
“a computer code of the Centre d’étude sur l’Evaluation de la
Protection dans le domaine Nucléaire (CEPN)”. It was found
that there was a close match, but with CLEARE producing afrom the CEPN Program. See Table 5.
24  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
1990
2000
2010
2 020
2030
2 040
2050
2 060
Year
A
nn
ua
l d
os
e 
(m
S
v)
 2,96 0
 2,22 0
 1,48 0
 1,295
 1,11 0
    925
    740
    555
    370
    185
Fig. 2 – Evolution of the effective annual dose for an individual living in areas with initial 137Cs surface contaminations of
185–2960 kBq m−2.
Table 4 – Effective doses and loss of life expectancy
within each contamination band over 1990–2060 for the
combined populations of the three Republics, in the
absence of relocation.
137Cs surface
contamination
kBq m−2
Effective
cumulative
dose mSv
Loss of life
expectancy
days
185–370 50 9.6
370–555 74 14.4
555–740 99 19.2
740–925 124 24.0
925–1110 149 28.8
1110–1295 173 33.6
1295–1480 198 38.4
1480–2220 260 50.5
2220–2960 359 69.8
>2960 458 89.0
Table 5 – Comparison of loss of life expectancy in days
against initial surface contamination between CLEARE
and the CEPN Program.
Initial surface
contamination (kBq m−2)
185 555 1480
CLEARE 7.0 16.4 39.9
CEPN Program 6.4 15 35.8
reliant for their living. Moreover there might be signiﬁcantApplying CLEARE, it was found that the average dose for
the 900 people living in the most contaminated regions would
have led to a loss of life expectancy of 3 months (89 days) if
they had not been relocated in 1990. In the lowest band of the
effective relocation area (555–740 kBq m−2), the average dose
would have caused 19 days to be lost. The average dose for the
207,000 people in all areas with more  than 555 kBq m−2 activ-
ity would have led to a loss of life expectancy of 24 days. Thus
the person relocated in 1990 receiving the average dose will
have achieved a gain in life expectancy of about 3½ weeks
as a result of the decrease in radiation exposure achieved.
These ﬁgures on reduction of life expectancy may be put into
an initial context by noting that, according to Levchuk (2009),
preventable alcohol-related deaths in Ukraine reduced malelife expectancy by 5.2 years in 1995. Meanwhile the average
Londoner currently loses 4.5 months of life through air pollu-
tion in the nation’s capital (9 months loss of life expectancy at
birth (Darzi, 2014)).
In all cases where a life expectancy is quoted for a popu-
lation there will obviously be a variation in the length of life
experienced by different individuals in that population, and
the same goes for changes in life expectancy. Thomas (2017)
considers the loss of life expectancy for those who  suffer a
radiation induced cancer, ﬁnding that they are likely to lose
between 8 and 22 years of life expectancy based on UK life
tables, ﬁgures that may be compared with the roughly 40 years
of life expectancy taken away on average by an immediately
fatal accident such as a car crash, rail crash or drowning after
a dam collapse. A much smaller ﬁgure for the population-
average loss of life expectancy implies that the number of
victims will be small.
The J-value can improve upon relative measures by provid-
ing an objective method with which the cost-effectiveness of
any life extending activity may be judged. As noted in Section
3, a J-value of greater than 1 indicates that more  is being spent
than is warranted by the improvement in safety, with J = 2, for
example, indicating that twice as much is being spent as is
economically and scientiﬁcally justiﬁed.
Lochard and Schneider (1992, Table 12) report the cost of
relocation as 42,260 roubles per head, about 12 times the
Soviet GDP per head in 1990 of 3532 roubles (Table 1). This
ratio is signiﬁcantly higher, for example, than that of average
house price to median full-time earnings in the UK, which, in
the years since 1983, peaked at 5.86 in 2007 (Lloyd’s Banking
Group, 2016). However it comprises the construction costs of
not only the new dwellings but also shops and other infras-
tructure, in addition to about 12% in compensation payments
(see Table 9 of Lochard and Schneider, 1992). The ﬁgures imply
that the overall cost of relocation in the USSR was compara-
tively high. On the other hand, one might question whether
this level of compensation would actually have been adequate,
given that relocation would have meant that many  if not all
would need to start a new life from scratch, with farmers, for
example, being deprived of the farmland on which they were
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Table 6 – Population, loss of life expectancy and J-values
for relocating people from the areas with 137Cs
contamination in 1990 above the limits given in column
1.
137Cs
contamination
kBq m−2
Population Average loss of life
expectancy days
J-value
>185 705,600 14.8 17.5
>370 293,800 22.1 11.7
>555 206,600 25.3 10.2
>740 88,700 33.4 7.8
>925 60,600 37.8 6.9
>1110 35,700 44.1 5.9
>1295 20,000 52.3 5.0
>1480 14,700 57.3 4.5
>2220 4300 73.8 3.5
>2960 900 89.0 2.9
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edly of concern, are susceptible to medical treatment, which
may ensure full remission in 97%–99% of cases (UNSCEAR,oss of life expectancy if the move led to reduced socio-
conomic status, which seems highly possible after a rapid
elocation. A recent study based on data from the UK, France,
witzerland, Portugal, Italy, USA and Australia has shown low
ocio-economic status to be associated with a 2.1 year reduc-
ion in life expectancy between ages 40 and 85 (Strigini et al.,
017). No such effect has been taken into account in the J-value
nalysis contained in this paper, but it is clear that a reduc-
ion of life expectancy of this order associated with relocation
ould strengthen considerably the argument against moving
eople away from their homes permanently.
Using the ﬁgure of 42,260 roubles together with the eco-
omic parameters listed in Table 1, the J-value was calculated
or each of the ten individual dose bands. (The effect of a relo-
ation cost per person higher than 42,260 roubles would be to
ncrease the J-values in each case and decrease the incentive
o relocate).
Table 6 shows the J-value for relocating all the people ini-
ially living in areas with 137Cs surface contamination above
he given limits (corresponding to the lower bounds of each
and in Table 2). These results are further illustrated in Fig. 3.
For the 900 people living in areas with the highest
adio-caesium activity in 1990 (more than 2960 kBq m−2), the
elocation had a J-value of 2.9. At the nominal limit of the State
ll-Union and Republican Programme (137Cs contamination
ore than 1480 kBq m−2) the J-value would have been 4.5, and
or the 206,600 people above the effective relocation limit of
55 kBq m−2, the J-value is 10.2.This J-value analysis shows that the cost of relocating
the 220,000 people who were actually moved following 1990,
exceeded the beneﬁt of their increased life expectancy by an
order of magnitude. Furthermore, with J-values signiﬁcantly
in excess of unity for even the most contaminated regions,
the conclusion must be drawn that, based on the preservation
of life quality, as measured by the life quality index, there was
no case for relocation post-1990.
The J-value model is a more  recent development than
the human-capital-plus-radiation-risk-aversion model used
25 years ago by Lochard and Schneider and, moreover, has
been validated recently against pan-national data on life
extending decision making (Thomas and Waddington, 2017)
and against within-nation data on the increase life expectancy
at birth with GDP per head (Thomas, 2017a). Nevertheless,
it is striking that the J-value conclusions are in close agree-
ment with the ﬁndings of Lochard and Schneider (1992), as
summarised in Lochard et al. (1992).
5.  Chernobyl  relocation  in  1986
At the time of the Chernobyl accident, the Soviet state had
strong powers of compulsion, and true costs were difﬁcult to
ascertain in the absence of a market economy. Vast resources
were potentially available and a cautious approach was taken
towards minimising radiation dose, with limited communi-
cation and discussion of measures, concerns, and available
scientiﬁc information. Against this background there are clear
difﬁculties in assessing the cost-effectiveness of the reloca-
tion and relocation strategy in the immediate aftermath of the
accident. Nevertheless it is possible to make estimates of the
loss of life expectancy and the J-values for the early (pre-1990)
relocation measures.
Less effort appears to have been devoted in the very ﬁrst
stages of the accident, as compared with later on, to protecting
either the power plant workers and emergency responders or
the population of the surrounding areas. Those on-site were
subjected to high levels of radiation from the exposed core and
from the core debris that was scattered across the site. One
hundred and thirty-four workers suffered from acute radiation
syndrome, of whom twenty-eight died in the immediate after-
math of the accident. Children were playing outdoors in the
nearby town of Pripyat, only 3 km from the site, as the accident
unfolded. It was not until the following day that the 50,000
residents of Pripyat and Yanov were relocated in buses (Smith
and Beresford, 2005, p. 6). Over the following days and weeks,
a total of 116,317 people were relocated from their homes in
Ukraine, Belarus and Russia (Table 7, with numbers taken from
UNSCEAR, 2000).
There was a clear increase in the incidence of thyroid can-
cer amongst those aged under 18 at the time of the Chernobyl
accident and living in the whole of Belarus, the whole of the
Ukraine and in the most affected areas of the Russian Fed-
eration (Nuclear Europe Worldscan, 1996). It was possible to
deduce from epidemiological data to the end of 1998 that the
mean latency period was 17 years, but with a large standard
deviation, 10 years, that meant that some cases came to light
within 4 years of the accident (Thomas and Zwissler, 2003).
The eventual number of victims was predicted to lie between
3300 and 7600, and a total of 6848 cases were reported to the
end of 2005 (UNSCEAR, 2008). These cancers, while undoubt-
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Table 7 – The relocated populations of the USSR in 1986 (UNSCEAR, 2000, p. 472).
Area Date Number
Ukraine 91,406
Pripyat & Yanov 27 April 49,614
10-km zone south 30 April–3 May 10,090
30-km zone (incl. Chernobyl) 3–7 May 28,133
Outside 30-km zone May–September 3569
Belarus 24,725
30-km zone 2–7 May 11,358
Outside 30-km zone 3–10 June 6,017
Outside 30-km zone August–September 7350
Russia 186
Bryansk 186
Total
Table 8 – Distribution of the estimated ﬁrst-year doses
from external irradiation to Belarusians relocated in
1986 if they had stayed in place.
External dose experienced by relocated
Belarusians if they had stayed in place (mSv)
Number
0–10 1956
10–20 4710
20–30 3726
30–40 2552
40–50 1795
50–60 1226
60–70 961
70–80 726
80–90 565
90–100 453
100–150 1513
150–200 1015
200–250 814
250–300 646
300–350 494
350–400 371
400 + (mean = 584) 1204
From Table 24 of UNSCEAR (2000).2000). Their cause is most likely to have been exposure to
131I, which has a half-life of 8 days, as well as possibly other
iodine isotopes with shorter half-lives; a prior iodine deﬁ-
ciency amongst those affected may have been a contributory
factor. The early use of prophylactic iodine is the established
countermeasure to minimise the prevalence of uptake of
radioactive iodine to the thyroid. By contrast, the brief dura-
tion of the threat and the large areas and populations involved
means that relocation, which may take weeks or months to
complete (Table 20 of UNSCEAR, 2000), is likely to be a rather
ineffective countermeasure.
5.1.  Optimal  number  of  relocated  persons  in  1986
5.1.1.  Sources  of  data
Table 24 of UNSCEAR (2000) provides a comparison between
the actual external doses received by the population of Belarus
relocated from within the 30-km exclusion zone and an esti-
mate of the potential external doses they would have received
had they not been relocated. The calculated distribution of exter-
nal dose amongst the 24,725 relocated Belarusians if they had
stayed in place is reproduced in Table 8.
The collective external dose aggregated over the 24,725
relocated Belarusians if they had stayed in place is cited in116,317
paragraph 105 of UNSCEAR (2000) as 2260 man  Sv. This study
adjusted the average external dose given to those receiv-
ing above 400 man  Sv so that the total burden of external
dose matched this ﬁgure of 2260 man  Sv. The result was a
mean value of 510 man  Sv, which implies an upper limit of
620 man  Sv when a piecewise uniform probability distribution
is assumed.
There seems, however, to be a degree of ambiguity between
Table 24 of UNSCEAR (2000), which gives the “Distribution of
estimated ﬁrst-year doses from external radiation of inhab-
itants of Belarus evacuated from the exclusion zone”, and
paragraph 105 of the same report, which gives 2,260 man  Sv as
the “collective effective dose from external exposure averted”
but suggests that this may be a dose difference, since it is
“approximately 75% of the dose that would have been received
without evacuation”. On the other hand, it would appear to
correspond to the aggregate of the external doses received by
the 24,725 Belarusians in the absence of relocation, as found
from Table 8 by summing the products of numbers of people
and their mid-interval doses and the estimate of 510 man  Sv
as the average dose above 400 man  Sv.
Applying the same estimate of the average dose above
400 man  Sv in analysing the actual dose after relocation, also
given in UNSCEAR’s Table 24, gives a collective external dose
of 699 man  Sv in year 1. This ﬁgure lies within 10% of the
actual estimated external dose of Belarus’s relocated persons
presented in Table 23 of UNSCEAR (2000), namely 770 man
Sv and within 6% of the revised dose listed in Table B6 of
UNSCEAR (2008), namely 742 man  Sv, as listed in Table 9.
However, the fraction of dose averted by relocation is then:
(2260 − 699) /2260 × 100 = 69% of what the relocated popula-
tion would otherwise have faced, rather than the 75% quoted.
It is possible to deal with this uncertainty by assuming
that any relocation would have been 100% effective in elim-
inating exposure. This enables the ﬁgure of 2260 man  Sv to
be regarded as both the total external dose applicable in the
absence of relocation and the dose averted by relocation. This
procedure is conservative in the sense that it will tend, if any-
thing, to make relocation look more  attractive than otherwise.
We apply the same assumption of 100% effectiveness to the
1986 relocation from the Ukraine, where the collective exter-
nal dose averted is stated by paragraph 105 of UNSCEAR (2000)
to be “about 6000 man  Sv”.
From Table 23 of UNSCEAR (2000), summarised in Table 9,
the internal dose in the year beginning 26 April 1986 for the
24,725 Belarusian relocated persons was about 20% of the
external dose, while the corresponding fraction for the 91,406
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Table 9 – External and internal dose in 1986 for the relocated populations from Belarus, the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine.
Country Population
relocated
Collective Dose (man Sv) Average Individual dose (mSv) Ratio of internal to
external dose, 
External Internal Total External Internal Total
Belarus
UNSCEAR (2000) 24,725 770 150 920 31 6 37 0.19
UNSCEAR (2008) 24,725 742 148 890 30 6 36 0.20
Russian Federation
UNSCEAR (2000) 186 10a 10a 20 54 54 108 1.00
UNSCEAR (2008) 186 5 2 7 25 10 35 0.40
Ukraine
UNSCEAR (2000) 91,406 1500 1300 2800 16 14 31 0.87
UNSCEAR (2008) 89,600 1792 896 2688 20 10 30 0.50
Total
UNSCEAR (2000) 116,317 2280 1460 3740 20 13 32 0.64
UNSCEAR (2008) 114,511 2538 1046 3585 22 9 31 0.41
a Table 23 of UNSCEAR (2000) gives <10 Sv in each case. The small number of Russian relocated persons means the value is not critical to the
discussion of relocation strategy.
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pelocated persons from the Ukraine was 87%. The much higher
raction in the Ukraine as compared with Belarus conforms to
he observation in UNSCEAR (2000), paragraph 100:
“The main factor inﬂuencing the individual dose was found
to be the distance of the residence from the reactor”.
Table 23 of UNSCEAR (2000) was updated in UNSCEAR
2008), Table B6, and the differences are shown in Table 9 of
his paper.
UNSCEAR, 2008 reduced the estimate of the number of relo-
ated persons from the Ukraine by about 2% from 91,406 to
9,600, thus lowering the total number of relocated persons by
½% to 114,511. Because the difference is small, the original
umber is retained in this analysis for the sake of consistency.
oreover the dose ﬁgures given in UNSCEAR (2000) were cho-
en in preference to the revised ﬁgures from UNSCEAR (2008)
ecause they are generally slightly higher and hence more
onservative.
The most important change between the early and later
NSCEAR tables is the reduction in the ratio of the internal
o external dose in the case of the Ukrainian relocated per-
ons. Whereas the internal dose was regarded as nearly equal
87%) to the external dose for Ukrainian relocated persons in
NSCEAR (2000), the later document revises the contribution
f internal dose down  to the point where it is only half the
xternal dose.
The ratio, , of internal to external doses is needed to con-
ert the external doses listed in Table 8 into total effective dose
or the ﬁrst year. However, as shown in Table 9, the actual
alues of  reported in UNSCEAR, 2000 and UNSCEAR, 2008
mongst relocated persons seem prima facie to show signiﬁ-
ant differences with the MIB  model, which predicts that the
nternal dose will be 2–3 times higher than the external dose
n the early years. Moreover the model predicts that the time-
veraged ratio of internal to external lifetime effective dose
quivalent over 70 years will always be greater, with a limit-
ng ratio of ¯lim =5.24/3.18 = 1.65, irrespective of the starting
ontamination level. (See page 11 of Lochard and Schneider,
992).
The uncertainty over the relative sizes of the internal and
xternal doses led to a decision to multiply the external dose
roduced by the MIB  model by the average value, ¯, to estimatethe internal dose. Thus, while the MIB model is retained for its
description of the time-varying behaviour of external dose, the
estimate of the internal dose draws on the empirical evidence
of UNSCEAR (2000) when considering the 1986 relocation.
In the Base Case the average internal to external dose
ratios, ¯, were assumed to conform to UNSCEAR (2000), so
that ¯Ukr =0.87 for Ukraine and ¯Bel =0.2 for the more  distant
Belarus. Then a Sensitivity Study was carried out with dou-
ble these ﬁgures, namely ¯Ukr =1.74 and ¯Bel =0.4. It should be
noted that the Ukraine ratio, ¯Ukr, used in the Sensitivity Study
is greater than the limiting ratio, ¯lim = 1.65, for the MIB  model
discussed above.
The 186 relocated people from the Russian Federation
constitute a very small number compared with the tens of
thousands being relocated from the other two  Republics in
1986, and so the results will be insensitive to the choice of
the ratio, ¯Rus. Because of the negligible effect on the total
number of persons relocated, it was decided to put ¯Rus = 1 for
simplicity in both the Base Case and the Sensitivity Study.
The whole body collective dose was then formed of the sum
of the external and internal doses, where the distribution of
external doses in Belarus followed Table 8 (and hence Table 24
of UNSCEAR, 2000).
In the absence of speciﬁc ﬁgures for the costs of relocating
and relocating the population in 1986, it was assumed that the
cost of relocation would have been roughly proportional to the
GDP per head, with a constant of proportionality of about 12
deduced from the relocation cost and GDP per head at the time
of the 1990 relocation. The relocation cost per head in 1986 was
then taken to be 34,500 roubles.
5.1.2.  Base  Case  (¯Ukr =0.87  and  ¯Bel =0.2)
A probability density curve may be derived from Table 8 for
the size of dose received by the Belarusian relocated persons
in the ﬁrst year under no relocation. For the Belarusian Base
Case ¯Bel =0.2. The average total dose of the 1200 relocated
persons with the highest exposure would then have been
510 × (1 + ¯Bel) = 612 mSv  if they had stayed in place, while the
upper limit to the distribution becomes 620 × 1.2 = 744 mSv.
Fig. 4 shows the resulting probability density for individual
dose (external plus internal). The average combined dose per
head in the ﬁrst year for all 24,725 Belarusian relocated per-
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Fig. 4 – Probability density for total dose (external and internal) in year starting 26 April 1986 for Belarusian relocated
persons. The stepped full line corresponds to UNSCEAR (2000) data with ¯Bel =0.2, while the broken line is a ﬁtted lognormal
probability density. Base Case.
sons would then have been 110 mSv  if they had been left in
place.
As may be seen from Fig. 4, the distribution for individual
dose is approximately lognormal, and a lognormal distribu-
tion with the same mean value, 110 mSv,  was ﬁtted to the
data through minimising the integral of the squared error by
varying the standard deviation. The best match was achieved
with a standard deviation of 189 mSv,  which corresponds to
a median, 55 mSv,  that is half the mean. The matched log-
normal probability density is displayed in Fig. 4 also. The two
probability densities demonstrate clearly that most people
relocated from Belarus would have received doses well below
100 mSv  in the ﬁrst year if they had stayed in place, although
the distribution has a long tail. In fact the mean, 110 mSv,  of
this long-tailed distribution is also the 74% percentile. Hence
nearly three-quarters of the affected population would have
received a small dose than the mean value of 110 mSv.
The MIB  model for external dose was employed to ﬁnd the
1990 surface caesium contamination, C, that would lead to
external doses at the levels given in Table 8 being received
in the year starting 26 April 1986. Having established a suit-
able value of C for a given external dose in 1986, Eq. (15) was
then evaluated from t = − 2 (1986) to t = 68 (2056) to give a 71-
year long external dose proﬁle. Fig. 5 shows the case where the
external dose in the year beginning 26 April 1986 was 100 mSv,
illustrating the rapid fall-off in dose during the ﬁrst few years.
This reﬂects the fact that the caesium radionuclides are decay-
ing initially with an effective half-life of about 3 years as a
result of the early dominance of the shorter lived isotope, 134Cs
(half life ∼2 years) over the longer lived 137Cs (half life ∼30
years). [In fact the effective half life for 137Cs in man’s envi-
ronment may be 50% or so lower than the theoretical value of
30 years (Smith and Beresford, 2005; Robison et al., 2003; Paller
et al., 2014).]
The external dose proﬁle was then multiplied by 1 + ¯Bel =
1.2 to give the proﬁle for total individual dose (external plus
internal). This proﬁle was then entered into the CLEARE pro-
gram to ﬁnd the loss of life expectancy that would have
occurred without relocation for exposed people with any given
starting dose.
By setting J = 1 and using the economic parameters from
Table 1, the J-value method could then be inverted to ﬁnd
the minimum starting dose above which it would have beenjustiﬁed to relocate people from Belarus, on the basis of main-
taining a constant life-quality for the affected people, as given
by the life-quality index. By iteratively varying the total indi-
vidual dose for the year beginning 26 April 1986 and computing
the resulting dose proﬁle and J-value, it was found that a dose
of 126 mSv  in 1986 was required to give a J-value of 1 for the
affected Republics within the USSR. A 1986 dose of 126 mSv,
together with the associated dose proﬁle over 70 years, falling
rapidly over the ﬁrst 10 years as illustrated in Fig. 5, would
have led to a loss of life expectancy of 8.7 months.
A dose of 126 mSv  in the ﬁrst 12 months after the acci-
dent corresponds to the guidance given in ICRP (1991), the
International Atomic Energy Agency (1994) and a Working
Group set up under Article 31 of the Euratom Treaty (European
Community, 1993) that relocation will almost certainly be jus-
tiﬁed if lifetime doses are projected to exceed 1 Sv or dose
rates are likely to exceed approximately 10 mSv  per month.
ICRP (2007), paragraph 278, suggests that, when planning for
an emergency situation, a 100 mSv  one-off dose should be
regarded as an upper limit. However the previous paragraph
states that
“277. In emergency exposure situations particular attention
should be given to the prevention of severe deterministic
health effects as doses could reach high levels in a short
period of time. In case of major emergencies an assessment
based on health effects would be insufﬁcient and due con-
siderations must be given to societal, economic and other
consequences. Another important objective is to prepare,
to the extent practicable, for the resumption of societal and
economic activities considered as ‘normal’.”
where deterministic health effects may be caused by a dose of
400–500 mSv  or more  received in a short time.
It may be noted that the loss of life expectancy associated
with J = 1, namely 8.7 months, lies well within the variation
in life expectancy seen between different regions of the UK,
for example. Thus the average inhabitant of Manchester can
expect to live about 3¼ years less than the average person liv-
ing in Harrow in London (based on the 6½ years difference
in life expectancy at birth across the two genders (ONS, 2015)
and the average to new-born life expectancy ratio of roughly
0.5 appropriate for the UK (Thomas and Waddington, 2017)).
The allowable loss of life expectancy of 8.7 months would have
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een lower but for the fact that relocation, at 34,500 roubles
er head, is large by comparison with the GDP per head, in fact
welve times larger. (The relative cost of relocation in the USSR
fter Chernobyl was thus very large compared with the relative
ost of relocation in Japan after the Fukushima Daiichi acci-
ent. However the Japanese accommodation was expected to
erve for only a few years before the people could return rather
han being permanent. This may explain why the cost of relo-
ation in Japan was much lower relative to GDP per head. At
bout 37,500 international dollars per person, it was little more
han Japan’s GDP per head of 34,294 international dollars in
011. See Section 6.1)
Since the J = 1 value of 126 mSv  is above the mean dose,
10 mSv,  of this Belarusian population, the J-value analysis
ould not support relocation of the total Belarusian cohort
f 24,725. Average values are normally used in J-value cal-
ulations, a practice that would seem to ﬁt well with the
ecommendation of Lochard and Schneider (1992), who main-
ain in their Conclusion that best-estimate models should be
sed in preference to conservative-estimate models in a public
ealth context:
“The effectiveness of protective measures should be eval-
uated on a realistic basis, since overestimation of the
potential health impacts could lead to the misallocation
of resources; moreover, it may place additional and unnec-
essary stress on the population.”
However, Fig. 4 demonstrates that the dose distribution in
elarus is very long tailed, with some people receiving much
igher doses than the mean. Moreover, it is possible to deter-
ine, from the probability density of Fig. 4, the fraction of
elocated people who would have received at least 126 mSv
y remaining in Belarus. This fraction, fUNS, would have been
UNS = 0.24 in the Base Case. Thus, based on the maintenance of
heir notional life quality, as deﬁned by the life quality index,
ust under a quarter, 5930, of the Belarusian relocated popula-
ion of 24,725 actually merited relocation.
The fraction, fUNS, of the relocated Belarusians who actu-
lly merited relocation based on the UNSCEAR Table 24 data
s the same in this case as the fraction, fLOG, calculated from
he ﬁtted lognormal distribution. HencefUNS
fLOG
= 1 (17) mSv  in the year beginning 26 April 1986.
The number of people in the Ukraine who would have
received at least a dose of 126 mSv  was calculated by ﬁrst not-
ing that the mean dose for the 91,406 relocated Ukrainians, if
they had remained in place, would have been, after summing
the external and internal dose, 123 mSv.  The dose distribution
for the affected people in the Ukraine, which must have this
mean, is assumed to be approximately lognormal, as was the
case for the Belarusian relocated persons. Keeping the ratio,
/, of the standard deviation, , to the mean, , the same
as for the Belarusian case (which is equivalent to maintain-
ing a constant geometric standard deviation, g ; see Appendix
A) produces the probability density for dose in year 1 shown
in Fig. 6. Comparing the probability density for the Ukrainian
case with the Belarusian, it is noticeable that the fraction of
people with low doses is slightly less, with the median dose for
the Ukrainian cohort calculated to be 8 mSv  higher at 63 mSv.
In fact, the mean individual dose of 123 mSv  in year 1 lies at the
72% percentile, and it is estimated that two thirds of the relo-
cated persons from the Ukraine would have received a dose
below 100 mSv  if they had stayed in situ.
The J = 1 dose is slightly greater than the mean dose and
so relocation of the whole of the Ukrainian cohort is not sup-
ported. But the distribution of individual dose has a long tail,
as exempliﬁed by the very large geometric standard devia-
tion, g = 3.23. Using the lognormal distribution of Fig. 6, we
may calculate that 27% of the relocated Ukrainians would
have received a ﬁrst-year dose of 126 mSv  or above if they had
remained in situ. This corresponds to 24,694 out of the 91,406
Ukrainians who were actually relocated in 1986.
The 186 people relocated from the Russian Federation had
an average individual total dose calculated conservatively as
108 mSv  in year 1, which is just below that of the Belaru-
sian relocated persons. Applying the Belarusian fraction, 24%,
would suggest that 45 people merited relocation from the Rus-
sian Federation.
Thus the total of people whose relocation was justiﬁed by
the J-value is:
5930 + 24,694 + 45 = 30,669, that is to say 26% of the total of
116,317 people actually relocated.
5.1.3.  Sensitivity  Study  (¯Ukr =1.74  and  ¯Bel =0.4)
The average ratios of internal to external dose are doubled
in the Sensitivity Study for both Ukraine and Belarus, so that
¯Ukr =1.74 and ¯Bel =0.4.
30  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49
0
0.00 2
0.004
0.006
0.00 8
0.01
0.012
0.01 4
0 10 0 200 30 0 40 0 500 60 0 70 0 800
Dose in 1986 (mSv). Base Case
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 d
en
si
ty
Belarus Lognormal
Ukrain e Lognor mal
Fig. 6 – Probability density for total dose (external and internal) in year starting 26 April 1986 for Ukrainian relocated
persons assuming a lognormal distribution with the same / ratio as in the Belarusian case. The Belarusian lognormal
curve is shown by the broken line. Base Case.
0
0.00 2
0.00 4
0.00 6
0.00 8
0.01
0.01 2
0.01 4
0.01 6
0 100 20 0 30 0 40 0 50 0 60 0 70 0 80 0
Individual dose  in ye ar starting 26  April  1986 (mSv) (Sensitivity Stud y)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 d
en
si
ty UNSCEAR-based Data
Lognormal Fit
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Once again Table 8 is the starting point for a probability
density curve to be found for the number of relocated Belaru-
sians in terms of the size of dose received in the ﬁrst year with
no relocation. The average dose of the 1,200 relocated persons
who  would have received the highest dose if they had stayed
in place would have been 510 × (1 + ¯Bel) = 510 × (1 + 0.4) =
714 mSv,  and the upper limit to the distribution would have
been 868 mSv  based on the use of a piecewise uniform distri-
bution. See Fig. 7. The mean total dose per head in the ﬁrst
year for the Belarusian relocated persons if they had been left in
place would have been 128 mSv.
The mean dose, 128 mSv  is slightly higher than the J = 1
value of 126 mSv  in the ﬁrst year, and so an argument could
be made for relocating the whole cohort. But it is clear from
the probability density of Fig. 7 that the spread of doses is
very wide, and it is possible to determine the fraction of relo-
cated Belarusians who would have received at least 126 mSv
in year 1 by remaining in Belarus. This fraction, fUNS, turns out
to be fUNS = 0.265 in the Sensitivity Study. Thus based on the
maintenance of their notional life quality, as deﬁned by the
life quality index, 26.5% of the Belarusian relocated popula-
tion of 24,725 actually merited relocation, that is to say 6550
under the assumptions of the Sensitivity Study.A lognormal distribution with the mean value, 128 mSv,
was ﬁtted to the data through varying the standard deviation
so as to minimise the integral of the squared error. Fig. 7 shows
the result. Based on the ﬁtted lognormal distribution, the frac-
tion, fLOG, of the number of relocated Belarusians predicted to
merit relocation in the Sensitivity Study is fLOG =0.283, close to
the fraction, fUNS = 0.265, based on the UNSCEAR Table 24 data.
Thus the ratio, fUNS/fLOG, is:
fUNS
fLOG
= 0.265
0.283
= 0.94 (18)
The number of people in the Ukraine who  would have
received at least a dose of 126 mSv  was calculated by ﬁrst not-
ing that the average dose for the 91,406 relocated Ukrainians,
if they had remained in place, would have been 180 mSv,  after
summing the external and internal dose, under the assump-
tions of the Sensitivity Study. Keeping the ratio, /, of the
standard deviation to the mean the same as for the Belaru-
sian case produces a lognormal probability density for dose in
year 1 shown in Fig. 8. The median dose is now 90 mSv.Clearly the average dose, 180 mSv,  received by the
Ukrainian cohort under the assumptions of the Sensitivity
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tudy, is greater than the J = 1 dose of 126 mSv  in year 1, and
n argument can therefore be made for relocating the whole
ohort. However, the raw fraction of relocated people from the
kraine with a ﬁrst-year dose of 126 mSv  or above in the absence
f relocation is found from the lognormal distribution of Fig. 8
o be 38.8%. A corrected ﬁgure may be found by multiplying
his raw fraction by fUNS/fLOG from Eq. (18) to give a corrected
raction of 36.3%. This corresponds to 33,157 out of the 91,406
krainians actually relocated in 1986.
The Sensitivity Study has made no change to the Base Case
ssumptions for the doses received in the Russian Federation,
nd so the same fraction, 24%, merited relocation, implying 45
eople.
Thus the total of people who  ought to be relocated under
he Sensitivity Study is 6, 550 + 33,157 + 45 = 39,751, that is to
ay 34% of the total of 116,317 people actually relocated.
Comparing the optimal total number of people recom-
ended for relocation under the Sensitivity Study, 39,751, with
he number recommended under the Base Case, 30,669, it is
lear that the doubling of the ratios of internal to external dose
or Ukraine, ¯Ukr, and Belarus, ¯Bel, has had only a limited effect
n the ﬁnal fraction meriting relocation.
.2.  Identiﬁcation  of  the  people  meriting  relocation:  the
5th percentile  heuristic
he ﬁgures of 30,669 (Base Case) and 39,751 (Sensitivity Study)
erived in Section 5.1 may be regarded as the optimal range for
he numbers to be relocated, based on the maintenance of the
otional life quality of the affected persons, as measured by
he life quality index. However, it relies on the disaggregation
f individual doses, and it is recognised that it will be difﬁ-
ult to identify precisely the people concerned. Lochard and
chneider (1992) were tackling a similar problem when they
ntroduced their “coefﬁcient of relocation”, intended to cover
he following two cases:
“First, for social and economic reasons, the relocation of
a given settlement or a set of settlements may necessi-
tate the additional relocation of neighbouring settlements
where these are economically dependent on those relo-
cated. Secondly, there may be many  people in each Republic
who wish to be relocated, even when the level of contami-
nation is below the criterion.”They set their coefﬁcient of relocation at 1.0 in their paired
base cases, LS1 and LS2, a value that implies that relocation
should apply only to the people level living in 1990 in an area
of sufﬁciently harmful contamination as identiﬁed by their
model, and not to social or economic neighbours facing a
smaller contamination hazard. However, in a sensitivity study,
they set the coefﬁcient at 2.0, thus doubling the number to be
relocated, although they reported that this did not make a very
big difference to the numbers recommended for relocation,
since the base number was either zero or else small.
An alternative approach is put forward here, based on the
concept of the “representative person” recommended by the
International CommissionInternational Commission for Radi-
ological Protection (ICRP) when assessing countermeasures
against radiation exposure. The ICRP deﬁnes a “representative
person” such that “the probability is less than 5% that a person
drawn at random from the population will receive a greater
dose” (ICRP, 2006, paragraph 89). It is implicit in the ICRP deﬁni-
tion that the representative persons are distributed randomly
in the population and assumed impossible to identify. Hence
a protective measure, required only for these “high-end” peo-
ple, will be applied generally, based on the reasoning that any
given individual in the population will have a 1 in 20 chance
of needing such a level of protection
While retaining the concept of representative persons
being randomly distributed in the population, it is possible to
divide the population into bands of increasing contamination
in the way set out by Lochard and Schneider in their 1992 study.
The advantage of this procedure is that the average dose may
be found for members of each subpopulation, which will, in
practice, correspond to a given settlement or village. Beneﬁt is
then taken from the work explained on page 478 of UNSCEAR
(2000), which reports on the relative distribution of external
doses in 1991 and 1992 for 906 inhabitants of 20 Belarusian
villages. It was found that
“a log-normal distribution with a geometric standard
deviation of 1.54 provides a good approximation of the nor-
malized individual doses from external irradiation.”
Assuming as in the previous section that the internal dose
is a constant fraction of the external dose allows the same
value for geometric standard deviation, g = 1.54, to be applied
in the case of total individual doses (external and internal).
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Fig. 9 – Probability density for individual dose in year starting 26 April 1986 when the 95th percentile dose is 126 mSv  in the
ﬁrst year.
It may be noted that g = 1.54 implies a ratio, / = 0.45 (see
Appendix A), which is roughly a quarter of the corresponding
value, / = 1.72, that applies to dose distribution among the
cohort of the 24,725 relocated Belarusians, for whom g = 3.23.
Unsurprisingly the dose variation in a particular settlement is
much less than the dose variation over a much bigger region,
suggesting that a beneﬁt may be gained in disaggregating the
regional population into settlement cohorts before applying
the J-value.
J-value analysis may then be applied by taking the maxi-
mum permissible dose at J = 1 to refer to the settlement mean
dose. Alternatively, if the decision is made to adopt the ICRP’s
“representative person” instead as a precautionary assump-
tion, then the maximum permissible dose at J = 1 may be
assumed to refer to the 95th percentile person rather than the
average person in the population group. In this case the cor-
responding mean for the group may be calculated from the
dose at J = 1 using the empirically derived geometric standard
deviation in the manner described in Appendix A.
When the dose in year 1 at the 95th percentile is equal
to the J = 1 ﬁgure of 126 mSv,  applying the method described
in Appendix A yields a corresponding mean individual dose
of 68 mSv.  Fewer than 5% of the residents will experience a
dose of 126 mSv  if their village has a mean dose of less than
68 mSv.  Hence the population of such a settlement should not
be relocated under the 95th percentile heuristic.
The probability distribution for dose when the 95th per-
centile is 126 mSv  is shown in Fig. 9; its standard deviation
is 31 mSv  and the median dose is 62 mSv.  The mean value,
68 mSv,  coincides with the 59th percentile value when the
geometric standard deviation is 1.54. For such a cohort, imple-
menting the J-value using the average rather than the 95th
percentile value would result in the adoption of a counter-
measure that would already exceed what was necessary for
59% of the population.
5.2.1.  Applying  the  95th  percentile  heuristic  to  the  Base
Case  (¯Ukr =0.87  and  ¯Bel =0.2)
It is shown in Appendix B that the proportion of the relocated
population coming from settlements with a mean dose level
above 68 mSv  will be very similar to the cumulative probabilityabove a dose of 68 mSv  calculated from the stepped probability
density for individual dose shown in Fig. 4. This ﬁnding will
hold when the number of settlements is large and no single
settlement dominates the population as a whole. From the
probability density function displayed in Fig. 4, 37.5% of the
Belarusian relocated persons would have received a dose in
year 1 of 68 mSv  or more  if they had stayed in situ. Thus on
this basis, 9272 Belarusians (38%) should have been relocated
out of an actual ﬁgure of 24,275.
49,360 of the 91,406 Ukrainians subsequently relocated
were living in Pripyat at the time of the accident. The
dominant fraction (54%) of people living in the same town
requires a modiﬁed approach as compared with that applica-
ble in Belarus, where the population is roughly evenly spread
amongst a large number of small villages. This is explained
in Appendix C, where it is shown that under the 95% heuris-
tic, the population of Pripyat as well as 13,632 others from
the smaller settlements should have been relocated making
62,992 people in total, which is 69% of the Ukrainian popula-
tion actually relocated.
Assuming it was justiﬁable to relocate all 186 people from
the 4 settlements in the Russian Federation, the total of people
from the 3 Republics who ought have been relocated comes to
9, 272 + 62, 992 + 186 = 72,450. This is 62% of the number actu-
ally relocated, implying that the relocation of 43,867 people,
15,453 from Belarus and 28,414 from the Ukraine, may not have
been justiﬁed. The 1986 relocation exercise was 60% bigger
than justiﬁed under the J-value plus 95% heuristic.
5.3.  Applying  the  J-value  to  Chernobyl  relocations  in
1986:  summary
The results include both a Base Case and a Sensitivity Study
to account for uncertainty on the ratio, , of internal to exter-
nal dose. In addition, the 95th percentile heuristic has been
examined, corresponding to the ICRP’s “representative per-
son”, where precautions that exceed what is needed by 19 out
of 20 people in the population are applied to all. The results
are summarised in Table 10.It is found across all these cases that between 26% and 62%
of the number actually relocated in 1986 could be justiﬁed on
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Table 10 – Number of people in the Republics of the USSR meriting relocation at J = 1.
Base Case Sensitivity Study 95% heuristic (applied to Base Case) Actually relocated
¯Ukr =0.87 and ¯Bel =0.2 ¯Ukr =1.74 and ¯Bel =0.4
Belarus 5930 6550 9272 24,725
Russian Federation 45 45 186 186
Ukraine 24,694 33,157 62,992 91,406
72,450 116,317
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Table 11 – Estimated number of people relocated is the
number of inhabitants in the various settlements as of
1.10.2010.
Inhabitants
as of
1.10.2010
Inhabitants
as  of
1.10.2015
%  returned
Tomioka Town 16,001 0 0.0
Okuma Town 11,515 0 0.0
Futaba Town 6932 0 0.0
Naraha Town 7700 976 12.7
Namie Town 20,905 0 0.0
Tamura City 40,422 38,500 95.2
Minamisoma City (half) 35,439 22,314 63.0
Hirono Town 5418 4323 79.8
Kawauchi Village 2820 2021 71.7
Katsurao Village 1531 18 1.2
Iitate Village 6209 41 0.7
Kawamata Town (half) 7785 6695 86.0
Total 162,677 74,888 46.0
Source: http://www.citypopulation.de/Japan-Fukushima.html.
The 20-km relocation zone bisected Minamisoma City and Kawa-
mata Town, and it is assumed that exactly half the population was
relocated in each case. It is further assumed that the reduction in
population of Minamisoma City and Kawamata Town was caused
by the non-return of relocated people.Total 30,669 39,751 
he basis of maintaining the life quality of those affected, as
easured by the life quality index. This suggests that reloca-
ion may not have been the best option for between 44,000 and
6,000 of the 116,000 people relocated from the Ukraine and
elarus in 1986.
In terms of the total number, 335,000, relocated in both 1986
nd post 1990, the justiﬁable fraction is found to lie between
% and 22%.
.  Fukushima  Daiichi  relocation  in  2011
n the hours and days following the Fukushima Daiichi
uclear Power Station accident, the Japanese authorities
rdered the progressive relocation of those living near to
he plant. At 20:50 on 11 March, settlements within 2 km of
he Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station were given the
rder to relocate (Futaba Town and Okuma Town). By 18:25
he following day (12 March) the relocation radius had been
xpanded to 20 km (the towns of Futaba, Hirono, Naraha,
kuma and Tomioka and the village of Kawauchi, as well
s those residents of Minamisoma City, Tamura City, Namie
own and Katsurao Village living within the 20-km zone). On
5 March, residents between 20 and 30 km of the site—who
ad been sheltering since 15 March—were advised to begin
oluntary relocation. On 22 April, compulsory relocation was
xtended to speciﬁc areas to the north-west of the plant
eyond the 20-km zone, extending out to 40 km for Iitate Vil-
age (UNSCEAR, 2013, para. 31–24). Note also that a relocation
rder was issued at 17:39 on 12 March to residents within
0 km of the Fukushima Daini Nuclear Power Station (which
uffered no radiation release) although this area was mostly
ubsumed within the 20-km zone of the Fukushima Daiichi
uclear Power Station (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014, p. 103).
Approximately 78,000 people had been living in what
ecame the 20-km “Restricted Zone” and about 62,000 were
iving between 20 km and 30 km of the plant (the “Reloca-
ion Prepared Area”). About 10,000 people were relocated from
he “Deliberate Relocation Area” beyond the Restricted Zone.
he UNSCEAR report gives the total number of relocated per-
ons as approximately 118,000 (UNSCEAR, 2013, para. 76),
mplying that about 30,000 residents of the voluntary Relo-
ation Prepared Area actually left their homes. The Japanese
econstruction Agency (2016) cites 154,000. The World Bank
eport gives the total number of relocated persons from
ukushima prefecture as more  than 150,000 by the end of 2011
Ranghieri and Ishiwatari, 2014, p. 105)—this Figure would
eem to imply that all 62,000 residents of the Relocation Pre-
ared Area had in fact left their homes. The report later states
hat 160,000 people had left their homes by December 2012,
f whom 111,000 were from the restricted areas and 49,000
ad relocated voluntarily (p332). Meanwhile data taken from
he website, City Population (2016), allows the relocation fol-
owing the Fukushima Daiichi accident to be broken down
n a settlement by settlement basis and produces an aggre-
ate number of 162,677. This ﬁgure allows for the fact thatthe 20 km exclusion zone bisected both Minamisoma City and
Kawamata Town by making the simplifying assumption that
the relocated population was exactly half the population reg-
istered on 1 October 2010 in each case. Despite the fairly crude
nature of this assumption, the estimated total is usefully close
to the ﬁgures cited above. See Table 11.
The number of inhabitants as of 1 October 2015 shows a
fall of 87,789, which suggests that less that half the people
relocated had returned to their homes 4½ years after the acci-
dent. The response at Naraha Town may indicate how there
may be problems of returning after a prolonged absence. The
Japanese Government had signalled in July 2015 that it would
be safe to return to Naraha Town on 5 September 2015, when,
according to Demetriou (2015), the dose level had fallen 60%
to 0.3 Sv h−1 or 2.63 mSv  y−1. However less than 1000 out of
over 7000 people had returned by 1 October 2015.
6.1.  Loss  of  life  expectancy  averted  by  relocation
The UNSCEAR report (2013, Table C11, page 191) gives esti-
mates of the radiation doses that were averted by relocating
the residents of twelve localities within the Fukushima Pre-
fecture. The external and inhaled doses were based on results
from atmospheric dispersion modelling while measurements
of activity concentrations in foods were used to estimate
ingested doses. A questionnaire issued to all 2 million res-
idents of the prefecture provided information about their
location and movements during and after the accident. The
National Institute for Radiological Science (NIRS) used these
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Table 12 – Estimates of the averted doses during the ﬁrst year for eighteen representative communities relocated within
Fukushima Prefecture (adapted from UNSCEAR, 2013, p. 191, Table C11), together with the gain in life expectancy from
averting the ﬁrst-year dose. (LLE = loss of life expectancy).
Locality Destination Dose in First Year (mSv) LLE averted (days)
Without relocation With relocation Averted
Tomioka Town Koriyama City 51 3.3 48 21.7
Okuma Town Tamura City 47 1.5 45 20.4
Futaba Town Saitama 38 1.1 37 16.7
Naraha Town 1 Tamura City 7 3.7 3 1.4
Naraha Town 2 Aizimisato Town 7 2.5 4 1.8
Namie Town 1 Nihonmatsu City 25 5 20 9.1
Namie Town 2 Nihonmatsu City 25 7 18 8.1
Tamura City Koriyama City 2 3.5 (2)b (0.9)c
Minamisoma City 1 Fukushima City 4 5.7 (2)b (0.8)c
Minamisoma Citya 2 Minamisoma Citya 4 4.8 (1)b (0.4)c
Hirono Town Ono Town 4 1.3 3 1.4
Kawauchi Village Koriyama City 2 3.3 (1)b (0.6)c
Katsurao Village 1 Fukushima City 6 4.3 2 0.9
Katsurao Village 2 Fukushima City 6 6 0 0.0
Iitate Village 1 Fukushima City 11 7.8 3 1.4
Iitate Village 2 Fukushima City 11 8 3 1.4
Kawamata Towna Kawamata Towna 2 9.3 (7)b (3.3)c
a The 20-km relocation zone bisected Minamisoma City and Kawamata Town, and some residents were relocated to other areas of the city/town
that were outside the zone.
b Parentheses indicate groups that received a higher estimated dose after relocation than had they remained in place.
c Parentheses indicate a loss of life expectancy as a result of resettlement.data to estimate the doses with and without relocation for
eighteen representative groups of people within the reloca-
tion zones. Table 12 summarises their ﬁndings. An estimate
of the variability about these dose values stated that individ-
ual doses could be “about two to three times higher or lower”
than the average, due to the variability of deposition rates,
food consumption patterns and human behaviour (UNSCEAR,
2013, para. C148). These ﬁgure are in good agreement with the
lognormal distribution with a geometric standard deviation
of 1.54 reported on page 478 of UNSCEAR (2000) and discussed
in Section 5.2. The 95% percentile heuristic (see Appendix A)
will be used to assess the sensitivity of the results concerning
Fukushima Daiichi.
The loss of life expectancy averted by relocation was cal-
culated from the NIRS estimates of the averted doses. These
results are also presented in Table 12 and are applicable to the
ﬁrst year after the accident. Residents in the immediate vicin-
ity of the power station (Okuma, Futaba and Tomioka Towns)
gained between 17 and 22 days of increased life expectancy
in the ﬁrst year of their relocation. Relocated persons from
the nearby town  of Namie gained 8–9 days, and those from
the wider relocation zones had 1–2 days of life expectancy
restored.
The NIRS study suggested that residents of four areas
(Tamura City, Minamisoma City, Kawauchi Village and Kawa-
mata Town) actually lost 1–3 days of life expectancy as a result
of leaving their homes and being moved to locations where
they received a higher dose.
Table C6 of the UNSCEAR (2013) report gives estimates of
the effective doses received by residents of areas that were not
relocated. Those in Fukushima Prefecture received 1–4 mSv  in
the ﬁrst year following the accident, which equates to a loss
of life expectancy of between 11 hours and 47 hours. In the
surrounding prefectures, the effective doses were 0.3–1.4 mSv,
corresponding to a loss of 2–15 hours of life, while for the rest
of Japan the expected loss of life expectancy was 1–3 hours
(from a dose of 0.1–0.3 mSv; UNSCEAR, 2013, Table C6). Theseeffective doses can be put into context by comparing them
with the average (pre-accident) background radiation level in
Japan of 2.1 mSv  per annum (UNSCEAR, 2013, para. E43).
The Fukushima reports contain estimates of the costs of
relocation and (temporary) evacuation that enable a J-value
assessment to be made. About 52,000 units of temporary pre-
fabricated housing had been built by early 2012 (Ranghieri
and Ishiwatari, 2014, p. 195). The World Bank report gives the
cost of building this housing as US$71,000–US$80,500 per unit;
other estimates suggest US$56,000–US$75,000 (International
Recovery Platform, 2013, p. 65). A value of US$75,000 was
adopted here. Each of the units houses up to three people,
so an average occupancy of two was assumed, giving a hous-
ing cost of US$37,500. They were expected to be used for two
years (International Recovery Platform, 2013, p. 64) but the
relocation has lasted for 5 years at the time of writing.
The dose averted in the ﬁrst year is taken from Table C11,
page 191 of UNSCEAR (2013). The doses averted for the sec-
ond year were then calculated from the MIB  model for dose
estimation cited in Lochard and Schneider (1992), making the
assumption that the dominant decay processes were the same
following the Fukushima Daiichi accident as for the Chernobyl
accident, predominantly the radioactive decay of 137Cs (t1/2 =
30.1 y) and 134Cs (t1/2 =2.1 y). Iodine-131 has a very short half-
life, at 8 days, which means that its effect will have essentially
disappeared within a month, as discussed in the ﬁnal intro-
ductory paragraph of Section 5. Its relevance to relocation,
staying away for a long time or indeﬁnitely, is thus limited. For
example, the time constant associated with the ﬁrst relocation
at Chernobyl has been found to be about 10.5 days (Yumashev
et al., 2017). At Fukushima Daiichi the people living between
20 km and 30 km from the site were not asked to relocate until
14 days after the event, while relocation for the population in
speciﬁc areas to the north-west of the Fukushima Daiichi plant
was not ordered until 44 days after the start of the accident,
when relocation would have offered no protection against
radioactive iodine whatsoever as there would no longer be any
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tisk from that source. The hazard from radioactive iodine is its
otential to concentrate in the thyroid gland and increase the
hance of thyroid cancer, particularly if there is a shortage of
ormal iodine in the diet. This was the case near Chernobyl,
here an increase in thyroid cancer was observed (Thomas
nd Zwissler, 2003) in those under 18 at the time of the acci-
ent although not in adults. As noted in the ﬁnal introductory
aragraph of Section 5, the best safeguard is the early use of
rophylactic iodine. To the extent that a dose from radioactive
odine is added to the ﬁrst-year dose, this will make the later
redictions of the MIB  model, which involves decay over years
ot weeks, more  conservative, in the sense of larger doses
ould be predicted by the MIB  model in subsequent years.
The actual dose reduction of 60% after 4½ years in Naraha
own cited in Demetriou (2015) is greater than the 51% fall that
he MIB  model predicts, suggesting that the model is likely to
ive conservative (viz. high) dose rates based on the ﬁgures
ited.
The Japanese Government prescribed 20 mSv  y−1 as the
afe-return dose rate:
“In December 2011 the government said that where annual
radiation dose would be below 20 mSv/yr, the government
would help residents return home as soon as possible
and assist local municipalities with decontamination and
repair of infrastructure. In areas where radiation levels are
over 20 mSv/yr evacuees will be asked to continue living
elsewhere for ‘a few years’ until the government com-
pletes decontamination and recovery work.” World Nuclear
Association (2017).
Hence the J-value was calculated by assuming that the
nhabitants of affected settlements would stay away until the
verage dose in the town had fallen to 20 mSv  y−1 based on
he MIB  model. This meant that the inhabitants of Tomioka
own would need to stay away 6 years, while those of Okuma
own would need to be away for 5 years. The inhabitants of
utuba Town would need to be absent for 4 years, while those
f Namie Town would need to stay away for 1 year. None of the
ther townships mentioned in Table 12 had doses above this
evel, and so, logically, their inhabitants should not have been
elocated.
It can be seen from Table 11 that Tomioka, Okuma, Futuba
nd Namie Towns had, in fact, not been repopulated by 1
ctober 2015. Relocated inhabitants of these and other towns
ecame eligible for “damages for mental anguish”, costed at
00,000 Japanese Yen per month during the period of relo-
ation (Matsuura, 2012), equivalent to about US$1000 at an
verage exchange rate of 0.01 USD per JPY. Those living in an
area where homecoming is difﬁcult” became eligible for an
mmediate payment of 6 M JPY or US$60,000, the equivalent
f 5 years at US$1000 per month, with the payment increas-
ng if the relocation was prolonged (Matsuura, 2012). The area
here homecoming is difﬁcult includes the above 4 towns, as
ell as Naraha Town (Takahashi, 2012). Therefore, in consid-
ring these variable periods of relocation, the cost per person
s taken to be the cost of temporary housing, US$37,500, plus
n additional payment of US$60,000 or US$12,000 times the
orecast length of absence, whichever is the larger.
The results are given in Table 13. Since maintenance of
ife quality amongst those affected and hence cost-effective
se of resources requires a J-value of unity or less, this
nalysis shows that the cost of temporary relocation of
hese populations was disproportionate to the relatively smallimprovement in life expectancy achieved by reducing the radi-
ation doses.
It is instructive to calculate the loss of life expectancy asso-
ciated with a safe-return dose rate of 20 mSv  y−1. Those who
experience this dose immediately after the deposition of fall-
out will see the dose rate drop off rather more  rapidly than
those who return to face the same starting annual dose in a
few years time. This is because of the initial presence of the
short-lived 134Cs isotope in addition to the more  slowly decay-
ing 137Cs isotope. The phenomenon has a small effect on the
loss of life expectancy as a result of slightly different proﬁles
of residual doses. Applying the MIB model to calculate dose
rates over a period 70 years long, the cohort subject to a dose
of 20 mSv  in the ﬁrst year after the accident would lose about 2
months of life expectancy as a result of the residual radiation
exposure. This would have fallen to ∼0.5 mSv  y−1 at the end
of that time, about a quarter of the natural background radi-
ation in Japan. Performing a similar, 70-year calculation for
those who have stayed away for 6 years and would experience
a dose of 20 mSv  in year 7 after the accident suggests that the
residual radiation dose 70 years after return is now about half
the natural background, at roughly 1 mSv  y−1. The loss of life
expectancy in the latter case would be about 3 months.
It may be concluded that the loss of life expectancy for
those experiencing an initial dose of 20 mSv  y−1 either by stay-
ing in situ or by returning up to 6 years after the accident will
be between two and three months.
The J-value results suggest that, under the Japanese
Government’s 20 mSv  y−1 safe-return criterion, it was not
advisable to relocate any of the 162,700 actually relocated. This
is because the inhabitants’ gain in life expectancy, even in the
most contaminated settlements where the dose would have
been around 50 mSv  in year 1 and falling in the way illustrated
in Fig. 10, would have been insufﬁcient to balance the fall in
their life quality index caused by their notional payment of the
costs of relocation. Attention might have been better focussed
on other remedial measures, found in a separate paper to be
cost-effective in many  cases (Waddington et al., 2017).
A number of further queries may be raised about the size of
the relocation. The ﬁrst is whether it is reasonable to expect
people to live in temporary housing for 4–6 years. Spending
a signiﬁcant fraction of one’s life in such temporary housing
might be seen to be undesirable, even if it can be borne with
reasonable equanimity for up to two years. People could be
expected to want a more  spacious dwelling space after that
time, for example, and more  amenities. It is a moot point
whether the $1000 per month mental anguish payment pro-
vides adequate compensation for a life that may well have
become quite restricted as well as disrupted by social and
economic losses.
There will also be economic costs of relocation associated
with the loss of the means of earning a living, and these have
not been accounted for here. Nor has allowance been made
for those whose relocation led to increases in radiation dose,
as shown in Table 12, as a result of the new location having a
higher dose rate than that pertaining at their old home. The
increased loss of life expectancy caused by being moved by
mistake to an area of higher radiation dose is low, of the order
of a day or two, but obviously this is not a desirable outcome.
As noted in Section 4.2 above, a recent study has pointed
to a reduction of about 2 years associated with low socio-
economic status (Strigini et al., 2017), and it is very possible
that those relocated after the Fukushima Daiichi accident suf-
fered a reduction in their socio-economic status. An effect of
36  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49
Table 13 – J-value assessment of the cost effectiveness of providing mental anguish payments and prefabricated
temporary housing, assumed to be used until return when the dose in the home location has fallen to 20 mSv  per year.
(LLE = loss of life expectancy).
Dose averted in
year 1 (mSv)
Number of years until home dose rate
≤20 mSv y−1
Locations LLE averted (days) J-value
48 6 Tomioka Town 82 1.5
45 5 Okuma Town 69 1.5
37 4 Futaba Town 49 2.1
20 1 Namie Town 9 11.6
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the order cited would outweigh by a signiﬁcant margin any
life expectancy gained by moving away from an affected area,
and would strengthen the argument against relocation. This
possible effect has not been included in the J-value analysis
presented here.
6.2.  Applying  the  95th  percentile  statistic
Given an average dose in year 1 of 25 mSv  in Namie Town
if relocation had not taken place, the corresponding across-
community variation in dose may be estimated by applying a
lognormal distribution with the geometric standard deviation,
1.54, found to characterise 906 inhabitants of 20 Belarusian
villages following Chernobyl, as described in Section 5.2. The
median dose in year 1 in Namie Town would be 22.8 mSv,  while
the dose at 95th percentile person, the ICRP’s “representative
person”, is 46.3 mSv.  See Fig. 11. If a complete community were
composed of people receiving 46.3 mSv  in year 1, they would
need to stay away for 5 years for the safe-return dose rate to
fall to 20 mSv  y−1. 71 days of life expectancy would be gained
by staying away, but the J-value is 1.5. This J-value is higher
than unity and thus indicates that relocation should not take
place on economic and scientiﬁc grounds.
Similar calculations performed for Futuba, Okuma and
Tomioka Towns produce J-values that are higher than unity
and thus suggest that no relocation should occur, even under
the 95th percentile heuristic. See Table 14. The decisions are
close for both Okuma and Tomioka Towns, but these throw
into sharp relief the implications of applying to all people
in the community a protective measure that is required for
only a small number of “high-end” people, 575 in the case
of Okuma Town and 800 in the case of Tomioka Town. Sup-
pose the J-value had come out just below unity rather thanhe years after an imagined big nuclear reactor accident.
just above, would it be reasonable to expect the whole popula-
tion of Tomioka Town to wait for another decade before being
allowed to return: 16 years as opposed to 6 years? The ﬁgures
would suggest that effort ought to be devoted to ﬁnding a bet-
ter solution for the small number of “high-end” people that
would not disadvantage the rest of the inhabitants so much.
6.3.  Premature  deaths  due  to  relocation
No radiation deaths occurred during or following the accident,
however there were a number of deaths directly attributed to
the relocation and subsequent relocation of the Fukushima
population. Hasegawa et al. (2015) summarise that
“After the accident, mortality among relocated elderly peo-
ple needing nursing care increased by about three times in
the ﬁrst 3 months after relocation and remained about 1·5
times higher than before the accident.”
The phenomenon of stress-related deaths after Fukushima
has been examined in detail by Murakami et al. (2015) for the
case of 3 nursing homes that were relocated. These deaths
need to be taken into account when considering the impact of
the response to the accident.
Following their relocation from the Futaba Hospital, ﬁfty
patients had died by 31 March 2011 (Ranghieri and Ishiwatari,
M., 2014, p. 103). As of September 2012, there had been 1121
deaths among the relocated persons in Fukushima attributed
to physical and mental exhaustion caused by the accident. Of
these, 35 had died more  than a year after the accident (p332).
The World Bank report also notes that the risk of death among
the elderly had increased by a factor of 2.7 for those relocated
from nursing homes. These ﬁgures point to the risk of death
from relocation reducing rapidly with time, although it may
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Fig. 11 – Probability density for dose in year 1 in Namie Town based on a geometric standard ratio of 1.54. Average
dose = 25 mSv; 95th percentile dose = 46 mSv.
Table 14 – J-value assessment of the cost effectiveness of providing mental anguish payments and prefabricated
temporary housing, assumed to be used until return when the dose in the home location has fallen to 20 mSv  per year:
95th percentile heuristic. (LLE = loss of life expectancy).
Dose averted in
year 1 (mSv)
Number of years until home dose
rate ≤20 mSv y−1
Locations LLE averted (days) J-value
95 16 Tomioka Town 240 1.02
87 14 Okuma Town 212 1.04
70 10 Futaba Town 156 1.1
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e mentioned that a report from Parungao (2014) suggests that
he problem may continue into the 3rd year, giving an estimate
f 1656 premature deaths from the stress of moving recorded
n the ﬁrst 3 years after the Fukushima Daiichi accident.
A generalised and simpliﬁed actuarial model was pro-
rammed to represent the key features of the situation. Based
n the assumption that the premature deaths affected only
lderly people, an increase in the hazard rate was calculated
or year 1 and year 2 amongst those relocated persons aged
0 years. Japanese demographics determine the fraction, 18%,
f the people being relocated who will be 70 or over, that
s to say 29,686 out of the total of 162,677 relocated per-
ons. Thus the increase in the hazard rate was taken to be
086/29,686 = 0.0366 y−1 in year 1 and 70/27,881 = 0.0025 in year
, where the latter denominator takes into account the num-
er of over 70 s dying in year 1, made up of the expected
umber of 720 and the 1086 excess deaths. Based on Japan
ife tables, the average loss of life expectancy amongst the
62,000 relocated persons due to the stress of the relocation
rogramme turns out to be 37.5 days.
Using the MIB  model to provide a 70-year dose proﬁle asso-
iated with an initial, year 1 dose, it is found that 37.5 days
f life expectancy would be lost by the average member of
he community for an initial dose of 13 mSv  in year 1. The
ose, 13 mSv  in year 1 followed by a 69-year MIB  dose pro-
le, would have caused equivalent harm to relocation. Thus it
ay be used as a yardstick, independent of the J-value, against
hich to judge the estimated ﬁrst-year doses without reloca-
ion given in Table 12.
Under the assumption that a full spread of ages typical
f Japanese demography is represented in each settlement,Namie Town 41 1.5
relocation becomes more  dangerous than radiation exposure
for the settlement’s inhabitants when the ﬁrst year’s radiation
dose lies below 13 mSv.  This is the case for all locations except
for Tomioka, Okuma, Futaba and Namie Towns. Residents in
Naraha Town, Tamura City, Minamisoma City, Hirono Town,
Kawauchi Village, Katsurao Village, Iitate Village and Kawa-
mata Town, whose averted doses were less than 13 mSv  in the
ﬁrst year, would, by this criterion, have been better off if they
had not been relocated.
The simpliﬁed model assumes that the old people live
within the community, and it is known that many  of the old
people affected by the Fukushima Daiichi accident were in fact
housed separately in old people’s homes and nursing homes.
Hence it could be argued that a different criterion could and
should be set for these older people, allowing them to remain
in situ while others around them were evacuated. But there
is a limit to the degree of separate living possible for older
people in care, since old people’s homes and nursing homes
are reliant on proper stafﬁng. Those caring staff will need to
live reasonably close by, and real problems must occur if the
settlements in which the staff live have been issued with an
instruction to relocate. How are the service needs of the old
people’s and nursing homes to be met  if everyone around is
moving out? This consideration places the old people back in
the community, suggesting that the analysis of the simpliﬁed
model would once again be at least approximately valid.
7.  DiscussionIn the early stages of a severe nuclear accident, there must
always be a degree of uncertainty on the course that the acci-
38  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49dent will follow. It is accepted that this uncertainty may lead
to a desire for precautionary measures that subsequently turn
out to be exaggerated in the light of later knowledge that the
accident was more  limited than previously thought. However,
our work is showing the clear difﬁculty in justifying the very
large population relocations instituted following Chernobyl
and Fukushima on grounds of radiological risk.
We concur with Lochard, Schneider and Kelly, whose basic
ﬁnding was that there was no radiological or economic case
for a second mass relocation from Chernobyl in 1990. Unfor-
tunately their recommendation was not followed and 220,000
people were relocated post 1990 in addition to the 116,000
relocated in 1986.
We  have examined the ﬁrst, 1986 relocation after the Cher-
nobyl accident, and shown that it is possible to justify the
relocation of 31,000 in the Base Case, with an upper bound of
72,500, a number obtained when the 95th percentile heuris-
tic is invoked in addition to the J-value. See Table 10. These
numbers represent between 9% and 22% of the 335,000 total of
people eventually relocated after Chernobyl. The modelling is
subject to inevitable simpliﬁcations and approximations and
no claim is made that these ﬁgures are fully accurate. But the
scale of the difference between what actually happened and
what both we  and the earlier authors, Lochard, Schneider and
Kelly, have concluded makes it clear that, viewed from the
perspective of radiological health and economics, the actual
ﬁgure of 335,000 people relocated must be regarded as much
too high.
It may be possible to explain the reasons for this appar-
ent overreaction and attendant disruption of people’s lives by
reference to political considerations. As noted earlier, Lochard
and Schneider (1992) suggested that money was being spent
on “direct or indirect compensation for those who may have
been affected by the accident, mainly from the psychological
point of view, in order to improve the public acceptability of the
situation.” But if this was indeed the case, then those charged
with spending the public’s money ought to have made it clear
that this was their intention, and that their primary purpose
was not to reduce exposure to radiation when, according to
Lochard and Schneider: “A large fraction of the money already
spent (or to be spent in the next few years) on improving living
conditions will achieve little or no reduction in dose.”
Transparency is required, in conformance with the con-
clusions of the World Health Organization’s Chernobyl Forum
Expert Group on Health (2006):
“What the Chernobyl disaster has clearly demonstrated is
the central role of information and how it is communicated
in the aftermath of radiation or toxicological releases. . . .
Nuclear activities in Western countries have also tended
to be shrouded in secrecy. The Chernobyl experience has
raised the awareness among disaster planners and health
authorities that the dissemination of timely and accurate
information by trusted leaders is of the greatest impor-
tance.”
Such transparency could be satisﬁed by adopting the “bal-
ance sheet” approach (Taylor et al., 2003), by which the
socio-political concerns are set down  clearly before judging
how far they should inﬂuence the ﬁnal decision. Thus it is
advisable, when taking decisions on public safety, to ascertain
the cost effectiveness of actions contemplated by applying the
J-value to establish a baseline. Socio-political factors may thenbe considered, which, in the case of relocation following a
nuclear accident, might include:
• allowing for uncertainty regarding costs and projected
doses
• avoiding splitting affected communities where possible
• a wish to reduce public anxiety over health impacts from
radiation
• a desire to reassure communities that an adequate response
is being made
and, possibly,
• a desire to be seen to be going above and beyond the call of
duty as regards risk reduction measures.
But it is important that the reasoning be presented trans-
parently to allow a balanced assessment to be made on
whether or not to move away from the baseline in making
the decision.
Against the socio-political considerations discussed in the
previous paragraph must also be set the possibility that
actions taken to allay fear may cause more  harm than good.
There is now considerable evidence to show that using relo-
cation as a means of providing reassurance and minimising
initial stress may not necessarily be the best strategy in the
longer term. Relocation itself can lead to very signiﬁcant stress
and concern in the longer term. Indeed the World Health
Organization (2006) has concluded that for those relocated
following the Chernobyl accident
“Evacuation and relocation proved a deeply traumatic
experience to many  people because of the disruption to
social networks and having no possibility to return to their
homes. For many  there was a social stigma associated with
being an ‘exposed person’.”
(See also World Health Organisation (2016), which states:
“The psycho-social impact of disasters and emergencies
has been well documented. It has been reported to be
the Chernobyl accident’s main public health impact that
affected the largest number of people.”)
This would suggest that socio-economic well being may
indeed have been reduced for Chernobyl’s relocated people.
As noted earlier in the text, Strigini et al. (2017) reported a 2-
year reduction of life expectancy for 40–85 year olds associated
with low socio-economic status. A penalty of this order would
outweigh signiﬁcantly the beneﬁts calculated for moving away
from a contaminated area for the overwhelming majority of
people relocated after Chernobyl.
The present study suggests that mass relocation after
Fukushima Daiichi was also a poor policy response. The J-
value analysis shows that relocation option was not justiﬁed
even for the most contaminated areas of Tomioka and Okuma.
Relocation has been shown to have caused a fall in the notional
life quality of the residents of these towns, as measured by the
life quality index. It is possible that the very extensive popu-
lation relocations effected in the months and years following
the Chernobyl accident set a precedent, now shown to have
been largely unjustiﬁed.
It is instructive to examine the signiﬁcant difference
between the information available to the authorities just after
the Chernobyl accident in April 1986 and what was available
to them four years later. The principal uncertainty on 26 April
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D986 was how long the release of radioactive material was
oing to continue and hence how much would be deposited as
allout. This uncertainty was resolved after 10 days when the
res on the stricken plant were extinguished and the release
as found to have stopped. However further time was needed
o set up the monitoring of radiation levels on the ground for
ll the districts affected by fallout, both close to and distant
rom the plant. Developing a model to take the radioactivity
eadings and then predict doses to the individuals living in the
ffected areas would have taken additional time.
Clearly such information was not available to the decision
akers in the immediate aftermath of the Chernobyl accident,
ut the necessary radiation monitoring was in place by 1990,
llowing spatially distributed readings of ground radioactiv-
ty. In addition, the predictive MIB  model had been developed,
llowing estimates to be made of the radiation doses (external
nd internal) that people in different areas would receive as
he radioactive contamination decayed in each of the succeed-
ng years. The model and these data, both available by 1990,
ere the basis of Lochard and Schneider’s ﬁnding against a
urther mass relocation at the time, a conclusion endorsed by
he more  modern and validated J-value method, which uses
he CLEARE programme to calculate the loss of life expectancy
aused by the falling proﬁle of radiation doses over 70 years,
or example.
Had both a good monitoring system for surface contami-
ation and an appropriate contamination-to-dose model been
vailable in advance of the Chernobyl accident in 1986, then
 good platform for taking sensible decisions on relocation
ould have been in place and could have been applied as
oon the situation stabilised, in the event after 10 days.
 similar observation may be applied to the accident at
ukushima Daiichi in 2011, where “after two weeks, the
hree reactors (units 1–3) were stable with water addition”
World Nuclear Association, 2017). Given such a degree of
nformation-preparedness prior to a big nuclear accident, an
n-line J-value decision making tool could be applied to guide
ecisions on relocation. The decision makers on the ground
ould then have access in real time to the sort of informa-
ion contained in this paper, and could take their decisions on
elocation accordingly.
A precautionary and temporary evacuation might have
een a reasonable policy response in the ﬁrst phases of the
hernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi accidents, when the ﬁnal
egree of radioactive contamination could not be estimated
ith a good degree of certainty because the situation had
ot stabilised, a process that took about 2 weeks in each
ase. There is a recent precedent for a large-scale but tempo-
ary evacuation downstream of the Oroville Dam, a combined
ater resource and energy generation installation situated on
he Feather River in California. Exceptionally high water ﬂows
own the main and emergency slipways led to erosion dam-
ge in both these overﬂow channels and the consequent fear
hat the emergency slipway would fail. This led to a temporary
vacuation order being placed on 180,000 people in northern
alifornia on 12 February 2017 (BBC, 2017a), an order that was
ifted 2 days later when slipway repairs had been effected and
 signiﬁcant amount of water had been drained from the reser-
oir (BBC, 2017b).
But even before the deposition of fallout is complete or
xpected to be complete in a big nuclear accident, a process
hat took about two weeks at both Chernobyl and Fukushima
aiichi, the availability of:• spatially distributed, real-time measurements of ground
contamination (an innovation that modern technology
could make viable)
• a prediction model for current and future dose such as the
MIB model
• a model, such as CLEARE, to convert dose into loss of life
expectancy
• a J-value program to provide evolving J-value guidance
would allow decision makers to make sensible judgements
on who should be evacuated on a temporary basis. The num-
ber of people asked to leave their homes if only for a short
time could then be minimised so as to keep disruption to a
minimum.
It is not a good idea to evacuate people unless strictly nec-
essary because evacuation and relocation are not risk-free
options in terms of physical well-being. Not only are there
penalties in terms of people’s life quality, but also directly
to their physical health. The simple modelling of Section 6.3,
which is independent of the J-value, points to evacuation and
relocation having, on average, a higher risk of death than stay-
ing in place when the doses averted by moving are low. The
evidence points to the need for evacuation to be used carefully
and sparingly, and relocation even more  so.
Our study provides evidence-based support for the ques-
tioning by Japanese medical professionals of the policy of
relocation. For example, Ohtsuru et al. (2015) stated that:
“On the basis of these ﬁndings, immediate relocation might
not be the best option, especially for vulnerable popula-
tions.”
They comment, further, that the public is likely to look to
medical personnel, in the ﬁrst instance, for information on
radiation risk:
“In such a disordered situation, doctors, public health ofﬁ-
cers, and nurses are often asked to explain the risks and
provide scientiﬁc information to the community as risk
communicators.”
They highlight the fact that psychological harm may pre-
dominate over radiation-induced harm:
“past experiences of nuclear disasters show substantial
effects on health and society, irrespective of the magnitude
of radiation effects.”
This opinion is endorsed by Hasegawa et al. (2015):
“past experiences suggest that common issues were not
necessarily physical health problems directly attributable
to radiation exposure, but rather psychological and social
effects.”
Linking these effects to fear of the effects of radiation,
Hasegawa et al. concluded that:
“The psychological effect on adults was strongly associated
with risk perception.”
A similar point is picked up in the Lancet Editorial in the
same issue (Lancet Editor, 2015):
“the understanding of nuclear risk by most clinicians —
and especially by the general public — has not advanced as
deeply or as widely as has the uptake of nuclear technol-
ogy.”
40  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49The tendency to overestimate nuclear radiation risks is
highlighted in a recent paper on Hiroshima and Nagasaki sur-
vivors by Jordan (2016):
“In essence, survivors having received 1 Gy irradiation
(∼1000 mSv) have a signiﬁcantly elevated rate of cancer
(42% increase) but a limited decrease of longevity (∼1 year),
while their offspring show no increased frequency of
abnormalities and, so far, no detectable elevation of the
mutation rate. . . . Yet the general public, and indeed most
scientists, are unaware of these data: it is widely believed
that irradiated survivors suffered a very high cancer bur-
den and dramatically shortened life span, and that their
progeny were affected by elevated mutation rates and fre-
quent abnormalities. In this article, I summarize the results
and discuss possible reasons for this very striking dis-
crepancy between the facts and general beliefs about this
situation.”
Part of the problem in understanding the risk from radia-
tion is the difﬁculty that everyone, including scientists, has in
dealing with uncertain hazards. Mathematicians have devised
an extensive and powerful theory of probability to describe
such situations, but the probability ﬁgure in itself is not easy to
understand or interpret. Radiation at low doses, the only dose-
levels experienced by a member of the public after a nuclear
reactor accident, is just such an uncertain hazard in the sense
that a small fraction of the people exposed may die from a
radiation-induced cancer some decades into the future, but it
cannot be predicted in advance which people will be unlucky
in this way.
Based on the ICRP recommended risk ﬁgure for a member
of the general public of 5 × 10−5 per mSv  (ICRP, 2007), someone
receiving a dose of 10 mSv  within a year has a 0.05% chance
of dying before his or her natural lifespan as a result. Per-
haps that can be understood as a small risk, but even then
it is hard for anyone to get an intuitive feel for how different
0.05% is from, say 0.13% or 0.008%, for example. But now sup-
pose that, following a big nuclear accident, the dose affecting
people in a neighbouring town  is 50 mSv  in the ﬁrst year (sim-
ilar to the worst affected Japanese towns after the Fukushima
Daiichi accident) and then follows the MIB  dosimetric model
discussed in Section 4.2. Hence the dose falls with time as
shown in Fig. 10, taking 57 years to get down to be the same
level as the natural background radiation of 2 mSv  per year.
If probabilities are chosen as the way of communicating the
risk, then people might be told that they faced a probability of
dying of 0.25% as a result of radiation exposure in year 1, 0.20%
as a result of exposure in year 2, 0.17% as a result of radiation
exposure in year 3 and so on. A more  compact single ﬁgure for
the overall average probability of dying as a result of radiation
exposure could be worked out, but that would still suffer from
the disadvantage that most people would struggle to interpret
it and put it into context, as discussed above.
A fundamental problem is that a statement of the probabil-
ity of death from a radiation cancer contains no information
on when that death will occur and how much life will be lost.
But being killed immediately is a very different proposition
from being killed in 60 years’ time, say, when the person may
have had the chance to live a long and potentially very full life.
The probability of radiation-induced death at some unspec-
iﬁed time in the future contains less information than the
statistic of life expectancy lost, which is innately more  infor-
mative as a result of incorporating the additional, actuarial
knowledge tabulated in the life tables. Loss of life expectancyprovides a scale that is able to differentiate between early and
delayed death in a way that the bare probability of death from
a radiation cancer cannot.
The J-value has change in life expectancy at its heart, as
discussed in Section 4.2, with examples given in Table 5. The
calculation for a given population is not trivial, and the loss
of life expectancy for a given radiation dose proﬁle will differ
somewhat from country to country (although it will be similar
for countries at a similar level of development).
But once calculated the change in life expectancy is sim-
ple to understand. The basic meaning will be taken on board
easily by most people, who gain familiarity from their earliest
years with the concept of personal age through celebrating
their birthdays.
Thus if a town in the UK were subjected to nuclear radi-
ation with the dose proﬁle shown in Fig. 10, the loss of life
expectancy amongst the residents of the town, including those
being born during its duration, can be calculated to be 42⁄3
months, based on the UK life tables for 2009. This is not a trivial
loss, but it may be put in context by comparing it with varia-
tions in life expectancy amongst the UK population. As noted
earlier, the average person living in Harrow in London can
expect to live about 3¼ years longer than the average person
domiciled in Manchester (ONS, 2015).
A loss of life expectancy of 42⁄3  months does not mean that
everyone’s life will be curtailed by exactly 4 months and 20
days. Most people in the affected town would live out their
full lifespan, but there would be some who would die early. No
deﬁnite ﬁgure can be given to how early, but it has been shown
elsewhere (Thomas, 2017b) that the loss of life expectancy
experienced by radiation victims will be about half what they
would have lost had they been victims of a fatal road or rail
accident or a fatal explosion. This is mainly because, although
the latency period before the onset of a fatal cancer will be
variable, it will usually be long, often decades long.
The loss of life expectancy amongst the affected population
caused by a one-off or a continuing radiation dose is proposed
as a very good alternative for communicating the size of the
risk both to experts and to lay persons.
8.  Conclusions
Earlier work (Thomas et al., 2006a,b) has used the J-value to
demonstrate that there can be a signiﬁcant variation in the
resources committed to the reduction of risks across a wide
range of areas requiring societal judgements, leading to an
unintended but inequitable distribution of resources. We con-
tend that proposed decisions should be judged ﬁrst on the
basis of their cost effectiveness, where the J-value provides a
baseline for decision making across all sectors.
In the case of the mass relocations after the big nuclear
accidents at Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi, it is clear that
many  of the measures taken were not cost effective, result-
ing in only a small restoration of life expectancy and high
J-values. Resources were committed that might have been
used to greater effect elsewhere, and there is a danger that
misleading precedents might have been set.
While there are uncertainties attached to the doses and
costs used, we have used the best estimates available to us.
Speciﬁc allowance for uncertainties in the doses associated
with the ﬁrst, 1986 relocation at Chernobyl has been made
through the inclusion of a Sensitivity Study whereby internal
doses are doubled. The numbers justiﬁed for the ﬁrst relo-
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aation at Chernobyl in 1986 have been tested further using
he 95th percentile heuristic, implying that the countermea-
ure would exceed what was necessary for 95% of the affected
opulation. The highest number of people who should have
een relocated in 1986, based combining the J-value with the
5th percentile heuristic, comes to only about two thirds of
he 116,000 who were actually moved out, never to return.
We conﬁrm the earlier work of Lochard, Schneider and
elly who found that further relocations after 1986 were not
ustiﬁed on radiological health grounds following the Cher-
obyl accident and concluded against the post-1990 relocation
f 220,000 people. We deduce that only between 10% and 25%
f the total number relocated in total after Chernobyl can be
ustiﬁed. A quarter of a million or more  people appear to have
een moved unnecessarily.
Given the Japanese Government’s 20 mSv  y−1 safe-return
ose, we  ﬁnd that no relocation was justiﬁed on scientiﬁc and
conomic grounds after the accident at Fukushima Daiichi.
his ﬁnding is robust against the 95th percentile heuristic.
While inclusion of more  precise knowledge on radiation
ose proﬁles, should they become available, might inﬂuence
xact numbers, any changes are unlikely to affect the main
onclusion arising from the J-value analysis, namely that relo-
ation should be used sparingly after a major nuclear reactor
ccident and quite possibly not at all. It is shown in a compan-
on paper (Waddington et al., 2017) that remediation measures
an reduce radiation exposure at reasonable cost, and it is sug-
ested that these may provide a better and more  proportionate
esponse after a large nuclear accident.
The availability before the event of a system taking spa-
ially distributed measurements of ground contamination in
eal time would open up the possibility of developing an on-
ine J-value tool to aid decision makers at the time of a major
uclear accident.
It is accepted that the number of people actually relocated
fter a major nuclear accident may be inﬂuenced by a range
f other socio-political issues. This is particularly the case
hen, in the words of the Lancet Editor, “the understanding
f nuclear risk . . . by the general public has not advanced as
eeply or as widely as has the uptake of nuclear technology”.
However it will be best for all concerned if the factors
nvolved in the decision are identiﬁed and addressed trans-
arently, including a statement of the J-value ﬁgure, so that
he effect of each on the ﬁnal decision can be made clear.
It is plain that medical professionals are seeking a better
ay of understanding the risk from nuclear radiation both
or their own information and so that they can communicate
n accurate picture to the people in their care who look to
hem for impartial advice. While the J-value offers a way of
alancing the risk against the amount that should be spent
itigating or countering it, as demonstrated above, it is sug-
ested that providing the calculated loss of life expectancy
ssociated with various scenarios offers a good way of com-
unicating the level of risk to lay people and professionals
like.
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Appendix  A.  Deriving  the  mean  of  a  lognormal
distribution  from  a  given  value  for  a  general
percentile  given  the  geometric  standard
deviation
Let the distribution of the random variable, X, be lognormal,
with the mean and standard deviation of X being  and . By
deﬁnition, the associated natural logarithmic variable, Y,
Y = ln X (A.1)
will be normally distributed. Let the mean of Y = ln X be m
and the standard deviation of Y be s. A standard result (see,
for example, Weisstein, 2015) gives m and s in terms of the
parameters,  and , of the underlying distribution for X as:
s =
√
ln
(
1 +
(


)2)
(A.2)
m = ln  − 1
2
s2 (A.3)
The probability that Y lies below m + ks follows from the
properties of the normal distribution, so that
P (Y ≤ m + ks) =  f (k) (A.4)
where f (k) is the probability that a normal variable is less than
the mean plus k standard deviations:
f (k) = 1√
2
k∫
z=−∞
e−
z2
2 dz (A.5)
where k may be positive or negative. Thus f (−1.645) = 0.05,
f (−1) = 0.1587, f (0) = 0.5, f (1) = 0.8413 and f (1.645) = 0.95, for
example. Since X = eY from Eq. (A.1), X will be monotonically
increasing in Y. Hence the probability, P (Y ≤ m + ks),  is also
the probability that X lies below the exponential of m + ks:
P
(
X ≤ em+ks
)
= P
(
X ≤ emeks
)
= P
(
X ≤ em(es)k
)
= f (k) (A.6)
Putting k = 0 in Eq. (A.6) gives P (X ≤ em) = f (0) = 0.5, which
deﬁnes the median, , of the underlying distribution: = em (A.7)
42  Process Safety and Environmental Protection 1 1 2 ( 2 0 1 7 ) 16–49Eq. (A.6) also allows a “geometric standard deviation”, g ,
to be deﬁned as:
g = es (A.8)
Thus Eq. (A.6) may be rewritten:
P
(
X ≤ gk
)
= f (k) (A.9)
It may be noted that the median must be less than the
mean for any random variable with a lognormal distribution,
a result that follows from exponentiating Eq. (A.3) and noting
the deﬁnition of Eq. (A.7).
Suppose that the geometric standard deviation, g , is
given, together with a general percentile level, xmax (k), asso-
ciated with the number, k, of standard deviations such that
Y ≤ ymax = m + ks.  Noting Eq. (A.9), the appropriate constraint
on X is:
X ≤ xmax (k) = gk (A.10)
Eq. (A.10) allows the median, , of the underlying distribu-
tion for X to be calculated as
 = xmax (k)
gk
(A.11)
It now follows from Eq. (A.7) that
m = ln  = ln xmax (k)
gk
(A.12)
Meanwhile s = ln g from Eq. (A.8), and so a rearrangement
of Eq. (A.3) gives the mean of the underlying distribution, X:
 = em+ 12 s2 = 
√
es2 = xmax (k)
gk
√
e(ln g )
2
(A.13)
Appendix  B.  Modelling  the  effect  of  discrete
population  settlements  in  Belarus
B.1  General  procedure
Let the population of a region be N, divided among M villages
or settlements, each of different size, Ni, and with an average
value, N¯i = N/M. Let each settlement be subject to a radiation
dose, Z, in year 1 that is lognormally distributed, deﬁned by a
mean radiation dose of i mSv  and geometric standard devi-
ation, g , that is common to all settlements, as per UNSCEAR
(2000), page 478, which gives g = 1.54. See also Section 5.2
above. The standard deviation, s, of lnZ  for each settlement
will then be the same for each settlement and follow from Eq.
(A.8) as
s = ln g (B.1)
The number of people in settlement, i, expected to receive
doses between zj−1 and zj mSv  will then be
n = Ni
zj∫
1
exp
[
− (ln x − mi)
2
]
dx (B.2)ij
s
√
2
x=zj−1
x 2s2The total number of people across all settlements, Nj,
expected to receive doses between zj−1 and zj mSv may then
be found by addition:
Nj =
M∑
i=1
nij (B.3)
The probability, Pj, that a person selected at random from
the whole population of N people would receive a dose
between zj−1 and zj mSv  may then be estimated as:
Pj =
Nj
N
(B.4)
Pj, will be a close approximation to the probability density:
pZ
(
zj
)
≈ Pj when the dose interval, zj − zj−1, is chosen to be
1 mSv.
The procedure has been applied to the Base Case (Section
5.1.2 and Fig. 4) of the 24,725 persons relocated in 1986 from
Belarus.
B.2  Geometrical  progression  of  mean  settlement  doses
The overall distribution of the total doses (internal plus exter-
nal) received by the relocated Belarusians if they had not moved
has been shown to be approximately lognormal (see Fig. 4),
making it natural to assume that the mean doses in the set-
tlements would have varied in a geometric progression:
i+1 = ri i = 1, 2, ..., M (B.5)
Here r is a constant and i is the mean radiation dose of
settlement i. Hence
r =
(
M
1
) 1
M−1
(B.6)
The mean dose for settlement 1 was selected to be the mid
point of the ﬁrst dose interval: 1 = 6 mSv,  while the Mth  set-
tlement was assumed to receive a mean dose equal to the
average for the highest dose band and so M = 612 mSv.  Then
the numbers, Ni, of people in all but one (viz. M − 1) of the vil-
lages were varied so as to achieve a probability distribution for
individual dose as close as possible to the stepped distribution
shown in Fig. 4.
This process was carried out for cases corresponding to
M = 2, 3, . . .,  35 and then for M = 48, 49 and 50 and for the
individual values, 75, 100 and 108. The number of Belarusian
settlements subject to relocation in 1986 was, in fact, 108 (see
Table 20 of UNSCEAR, 2000). Putting M = 5 produces the prob-
ability density shown with the dotted line in Fig. 12, while
setting M to 108 gives the probability density shown in Fig. 13.
The match to the stepped curve derived from the UNSCEAR
(2000) data is fairly good when M = 5, but it is clearly improved
when M = 108. The much larger number of control variables
available in the latter case allow the “higher frequency” vari-
ations to be captured more  effectively.
Fig. 14 shows the population of each settlement when M = 5,
while Fig. 15 shows the populations of each village when
M = 108. After allowing for scaling, the general shape of the two
curves is similar, but there is clearly a much ﬁner gradation
in mean dose when M = 108. This is brought out more  clearly
in Fig. 16, which graphs mean settlement dose against settle-
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The number of people living in settlements with a mean
ose of 68 mSv  or more  (derived under the 95th percentile
euristic; see Section 5.2) is found by summing the numbers
n each community with an equal or higher dose—to the right
f the 68 mSv  line in Figs. 14 and 15:umber of settlements is M = 5. Belarus Base Case.
Ni>68 =
∑
i:i≥68
Ni (B.7)
The probability that someone selected at random from the
population will live in a settlement with a mean dose of 68 mSv
or more  will then be Ni>68/N.
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The minimum feasible value of M,  namely M = 1, corre-
sponds to the case where all the inhabitants belong to the
same settlement. Since the mean dose for these people if they
had not been relocated would have been 110 mSv  (see Section
5.1.2), it follows that Ni>68 = N and so Ni>68/N = 1 at M = 1.
The theoretical, maximum value of M corresponds to the
situation where the population is so dispersed that there is
one village for each person, so that, in the case of the relocated
Belarusians, M = 24,725.
The general behaviour of Ni>68/N vs. M is shown in Fig. 17,
which shows that it falls rapidly for low M before steadying
out at an asymptotic value corresponding to the theoretical,
maximum value of M,  namely 24,725, when the mean dose
and the individual dose will converge. At this point Ni>68/N
is equal to the fraction of individual doses equal to or higher
than 68 mSv,  derived from the stepped probability distribution
of Fig. 4 as 0.375.
Fig. 17 shows that there is a good level of convergence for
M ≥ 13. The process of convergence may be understood by
deriving the difference, 	, between the closest mean dose and
68 mSv
	 =
(
min
i
|i − 68|
)
× sgn (i − 68) |i (B.8)
and plotting this variable against the number of settle-
ments, M.  See Fig. 18, which shows damped oscillations in 	 as
M increases. The sequence of high and low values for 	 mirrorsettlement number for M = 108. Belarus Base Case.
that for Ni>68/N shown in Fig. 17, and, moreover, the ampli-
tudes of the swing are also well correlated. It is clear that the
coverage within the range of mean dose values must increase
with the number of settlements, M, as may be seen by com-
paring Figs. 14 and 15. Fig. 16 shows how densely packed the
mean values have become at M = 108, at which point the mean
dose of 68 mSv  is bracketed within the interval (67.51, 70.49),
so that min
i
|i − 68|  = 0.49 mSv.  Clearly min
i
|i − 68|  → 0 as M
increases to very large values, suggesting that the oscillatory
behaviour of 	 and the linked behaviour of Ni>68/N will both
settle as the asymptotes are approached.
B.3  Sensitivity  study:  arithmetic  progression  of  mean
settlement  doses
The assumption of a geometric progression of settlement
doses was tested by using an alternative, namely an arith-
metic progression, so that the mean dose in settlement i + 1
is given by
i+1 = i + a i = 1, 2, ..., M (B.9)
where a is a constant dose interval given bya = M − 1
M − 1 (B.10)
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The arithmetic progression in mean settlement dose
ppears to be a poorer model than the geometric progres-
ion, as it is unable to provide a good match to the stepped
robability density of Fig. 4 for individual dose for values of
 below about 30. Nevertheless the arithmetic progression is
ble to provide a ﬁt that is comparable to that produced by the
eometric progression when M ≥ ∼30.
But, although it is possible to see some pattern in the
opulations assigned to the different settlements under the
rithmetic and the geometric progressions in mean dose, the
opulations of the individual settlements differ signiﬁcantly
rom one progression to the other. This is illustrated in Fig. 19,
hich gives results when the total number of settlements cor-
esponds to the Belarusian case, namely M = 108.
Despite the wide variation in the settlement populations
etween the progressions, however, the cumulative number
f people living in settlements where the mean dose is less
hat any speciﬁed level is similar under both progressions, as
hown in Fig. 20. The fractions of people predicted to be liv-
ng in settlements with a mean dose at or above 68 mSv  are
imilar under both dose progression models: 0.387 under the
eometric progression and 0.399 under the arithmetic progres-
ion at M = 108. Parallel results come when M = 30, where the
orresponding ﬁgures are 0.379 and 0.372.These ﬁgures are all close to the asymptotic value of
.375, despite the populations predicted for the individ-ual settlements varying signiﬁcantly. The locus of Ni>68/N
shown in the right-hand half of Fig. 17, where M ≥ 30, can
be expected to be reproduced approximately by a range of
possible progressions for mean dose across the Belarusian
settlements.
B.4  General  application  to  Belarus
The Belarusians relocated in 1986 came from 108 settlements
in Belarus, a number well above 30. Hence if the average doses
in the settlements lead to a probability density for individ-
ual dose that matches the one shown in Fig. 4, the proportion
of the relocated population coming from settlements with a
mean dose level above 68 mSv  will be similar to the cumulative
probability above a dose of 68 mSv  calculated from the proba-
bility density for individual dose shown in Fig. 4. This result is
likely to hold for a broad range of distributions for mean doses
in the settlements.
Appendix  C.  Modelling  the  effect  of  discrete
population  settlements  in  Ukraine
UNSCEAR (2000) Table 20 shows that the 91,406 Ukrainians
relocated in 1986 came from a large number of settlements,
viz. 75, but by contrast with the Belarus case, a dominating
fraction, 54%, came from one place, the town of Pripyat (pop.
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Fig. 21 – Probability density for dose in year starting 26 April 1986 for relocated Ukrainians if they had stayed in situ as in
s ofFig. 6, compared with version derived under the assumption
49,360). Thus while Section “General procedure” of Appendix
B will still be valid, a modiﬁcation is needed in the later mod-
elling of the discrete population settlements of Ukraine to
account for this concentration of people in one town. Appendix C.
UNSCEAR’s Table 20 gives the populations of 5 settlements,
Pripyat, Railway Station Yanov (pop. 254), Burakovka Village
(226), Chernobyl Town (13,591) and Bober Village (711). The
populations of the 70 other settlements are not given and so
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affected by the Chernobyl accident: Radiation exposure andre assumed to have a size equal to the average for these vil-
ages, namely 390. With the settlement populations, Ni, i = 1, 2,
.., M,  (M = 75), now ﬁxed, variations may now be made to the
 − 1 settlement mean doses in year 1, i, i = 1, 2, ..., M − 1 so
s to achieve a good match to the Ukrainian probability den-
ity for individual dose shown in Fig. 6. The Mth mean dose
ollows from the constraint that the total manSievert burden
s given.
It  was found necessary, however, to adjust the geometric
tandard ratios, g , for both Pripyat and also Chernobyl Town
o as to achieve an acceptable match to the Ukrainian probabil-
ty density. Rather than g = 1.54, the ﬁgure found appropriate
or small villages, the geometric standard ratio for Pripyat
merges from the optimisation process as 2.04, while that for
hernobyl Town is estimated at 1.81. These higher geometric
tandard deviations would appear to be reasonable as these
ettlements are townships rather than the villages. The conse-
uential larger complexity and geographical spread are likely
o result in a greater spread in dose.
Fig. 21 compares the Ukrainian Base Case probability den-
ity of Fig. 6 with that found by summing the optimised
umber of people in 1 mSv  dose bands and dividing by the
otal relocated population.
The optimum match occurs when the mean ﬁrst-year dose
s 101 mSv  for the inhabitants of Pripyat, under the assumption
hey had stayed in situ. The town’s majority contribution to
he Ukrainian relocated persons means that the optimisation
xercise is likely to act as a reasonably good estimator for the
tarting mean dose in Pripyat.
The probability density for dose amongst the citizens of
ripyat, shown in Fig. 22, has a greater spread than that illus-
rated in Fig. 9, where g = 1.54. The median dose is 78 mSv,
nd about 25% of Pripyat’s inhabitants would have received
he J = 1 dose of 126 mSv,  or more.  Hence Pripyat’s population
f 49,360 should be relocated under the 95% heuristic.
A further 13,632 people would have been living in Ukrainian
ettlements with a mean dose greater than 68 mSv.  Thus
9,360 + 13,632 = 62,992 people in all should be relocated from
he Ukraine under the 95% heuristic.
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